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The American Quarterly on the SOVIET UNION

Vol. II

No. 1



- The Soviet National Defense Program - - - Harriet Moore
- Blood Transfusion in the USSR - - - Regina Wender Fischer
- The Soviets Reform Youthful Offenders - - - Nathan Berman
- Serge Prokofiev and his Works - - - Nicolas Slonimsky
- Old Tutta; Kabardinian Folk Tale - - - translated by Robert Magidoff

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Table of Contents

	PAGE
The National Defense Program of the Soviet Union, <i>by Harriet Moore</i>	3
Blood Transfusion in the USSR, <i>by Regina Wender Fischer</i>	19
The Soviets Reform Youthful Offenders, <i>by Nathan Berman</i>	29
Serge Prokofiev: His Status in Soviet Music, <i>by Nicolas Slonimsky</i>	37
List of Works of Serge Prokofiev	42
The Old Tutta: A Kabardinian Tale, <i>translated by Robert Magidoff</i>	45
DOCUMENTS	
TASS Reports on the Fisheries Negotiations	49
Rules of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)	59
NEWS CHRONOLOGY	
December, 1938, January, February, 1939	
INTERNAL AFFAIRS	74
Administration, Agriculture, Art, Aviation, Communist Party, Defense, Labor, Science and Public Health, Miscellaneous	
FOREIGN AFFAIRS	77
European Affairs, Far Eastern Affairs, United States, Miscellaneous	
Recent Appointments	79

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THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OF THE SOVIET UNION

By

HARRIET MOORE

During the last few years the defense appropriations in the national budget of the USSR have been increasing rapidly, along with those of other countries, reaching, in 1938, 27 billion rubles, or 20 per cent of the total. At the same time, national defense finds its place in the basic directives of the third Five-Year Plan, as outlined in Molotov's report to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party:

"The tremendous development of industry and of the entire national economy during the second Five-Year Plan and the necessity of securing its further uninterrupted growth, especially under conditions of the intensification of the aggressive forces of imperialism in the world that encircles the USSR, require the creation of large state reserves, primarily of fuel, and electric power and certain defense industries, and also the development of transport. These reserves must be carefully distributed among the different sections of the country, eliminating unproductive long hauls and guaranteeing the basic economic centers of the country with the maximum quantity of local resources. . . ."

These are but two of the contemporary aspects of the Soviet defense program, for national defense has been a preoccupation of the Soviet government since its very inception. Lenin, in his report on War and Peace, March 7, 1918, referred to the new regime, born in war and the fight against intervention, as "we, who since October 1917 have become defencists, who have recognized the principle of the defense of the Fatherland." Since that time considerations of national defense have played a large part in economic, political and diplomatic policies of the Soviet Union. The monopoly of foreign trade was introduced, among other reasons, to prevent foreign economic intervention, to eliminate gradually the dependence on foreign sources of important goods and to prevent dependence on any single country for deficit materials. Likewise, the removal of Soviet currency from the foreign exchanges was

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again partly a defense measure, and Soviet economic planning has throughout had as one of its primary concerns the defense capacity of the country—this has dictated the stress on industrialization, the tempo of development, the location and nature of much of its construction. In reporting on the results of the first Five-Year Plan, Stalin said:

“Of course, out of the one and a half billion rubles in foreign currency that we spent on purchasing equipment for our heavy industry, we could have set apart a half for the purpose of importing raw cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. We would then have had more calico, boots and clothes. But then we would not have had a tractor and an automobile industry, we would not have had anything like a big iron and steel industry, we would not have had metal for the production of machinery—and we would have been unarmed in the midst of a capitalist environment which is armed with modern technique.”¹

The pressure of defense needs has been unrelenting on the Soviet government: from 1917 to 1920, civil war and intervention were at their height and until 1925, when Japan evacuated Northern Sakhalin, there were foreign troops on Soviet soil. In 1927 relations with England became so strained that danger of war seemed immediate; 1929 saw the armed clash with China over the Chinese Eastern Railway; and beginning early in 1932 Far Eastern border incidents have been a commonplace. To meet these recurrent threats of war, the Soviet government has used all its defense weapons—diplomatic, economic, and military, beginning with the diplomatic retreat at Brest-Litovsk “yielding space to gain time,” passing through the middle period where offers of a huge market both for goods at high prices and loans at usurious rates served in part as bribes for peaceful relations, until the internal economic and military strength of the country could be built up. Coordinating all three methods, shifting emphasis from one to another as circumstances dictated, the Soviet government has built its program of national defense. The following sections of this article give a brief résumé of the present position of Soviet defenses in their three phases—economic, military and diplomatic.

1. *From the First to the Second Five Year Plan*, New York, 1933. p. 24

National Economy and Defense

In discussions preceding the adoption of the first Five-Year Plan, Voroshilov, Commissar of Defense, made a report on the defense aspects of planning, the conclusions of which he summarized as follows:

"1. The five-year plan for national economy should take as its starting point the inevitability of an armed attack on the USSR and consequently the necessity, within the limits of material resources, of organizing a defense of the Soviet Union that will guarantee the victorious repulse of the united forces of our probable enemies.

2. The industrialization of the country predetermines the fighting capacity of the USSR. And for this very reason military considerations should introduce certain correctives in the concrete plans for industrial construction. In particular: a. regionalization of industry should correspond to the demands of strategic security; b. metallurgy—both ferrous and especially non-ferrous, in the very near future must guarantee the minimum requirements of defense; c. the general plan for the development of industry should provide for the investment of sufficient funds in those branches which are at present the weak spots in our economy and defense (auto-tractor production, chemical industry, etc.)

3. The development of agriculture should provide for as rapid as possible a solution of the problem of raw materials from internal sources, freeing us in that way from imports and dependence on foreign countries.

4. The creation of reserves (natural and monetary) should be undertaken on the basis of a careful consideration of defense needs.

5. The construction of the armed forces (the Red Army, the Navy and the Air Force) should proceed on the basis of the necessity of raising the technical and military power to the level of a first-class European army.

6. Along with the five-year plan, it is necessary immediately to undertake the detailed working out of the planning of the whole national economy in time of war. . . ."2 [Translation—H.M.]

Taking this outline as a starting point, how far has the Soviet economy met these defense needs? As regards necessary raw materials, the Soviet Union is now perhaps in the most favored position of any country in the world. Always well endowed with natural resources, extensive exploration work has further added to its riches and of the twenty-two strategic raw ma-

2. K. E. Voroshilov, *Stati i Rech'i*, Moscow, 1937. p. 210

terials³ the Soviet Union now produces over 50 per cent of its domestic needs of all except tungsten, tin, antimony and nickel. Of the others, it continues to import copper, aluminum, lead and rubber in considerable amounts.

An indication of the extent to which this relative independence has been attained in the last decade can be seen from the following table:

IN PER CENT OF DOMESTIC NEED DOMESTICALLY SUPPLIED ⁴				
	1913	1928	1935	1936
Oil	100%	100%	100%	100%
Coal	80.3	100	100	100
Iron Ore	100	100	100	100
Manganese	100	100	100	100
Zinc	9.7	6.4	97.1	100
Aluminum	0	0	85.3	100
Rubber	0	0	40.1	56
Superphosphates	44.5	70.9	100	100
Cellulose	78.0	70.0	99.1	99.3
Cotton	44.4	63.8	100	100
Chromite	100	100	100	100

The story of the drive for raw materials includes many such colorful chapters as the opening of the Arctic regions to find deposits of nickel, tin, and phosphates, the search for rubber-bearing plants to supplement the work of the scientific laboratories in making synthetic rubber, and the transformation of Central Asian agriculture to make it the cotton field of the USSR. The efforts in this direction continue and, as a result, in the very near future nickel should be erased from the list of deficit materials when three new plants come into operation—one at Monchegorsk on the Kola peninsula, one in the South Urals and one in Kazakhstan. Figures for 1938 show a steady increase in the output of other important minerals—16.6 per cent increase in aluminum production over 1937; 3.2 per cent increase in copper; 26 per cent increase in lead.

In the output of basic industrial products, the developments over the last decade have even more completely reversed the pre-war situation than in the case of raw materials. The production of pig iron has grown from 3.3 million tons in 1928 to

3. As listed in Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials*,—nickel, antimony, tin, tungsten, mica, mercury, phosphates, potash, chromite, rubber, manganese, wool, zinc, sulphur, lead, copper, oil, aluminum, cotton, iron ore, coal, and nitrates.

4. "Rost Tekhniko-Ekonomicheskoi Bazy Oborony SSSR za 20 Let," *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika*, No. 10-11, 1937, p. 143

14.7 million tons in 1937 and similar increases can be found in the other heavy industries, a few of which may be seen in the following table.

	1913	1928	1932	1937
Coal (1,000 tons)	29,117	35,510	64,664	127,000
Oil and Gas (1,000 tons) ...	9,234	11,749	22,319	30,600
Electric power (Million kw/h)	1,945	5,007	13,540	36,400
Pig Iron (1,000 tons)	4,216	3,282	6,161	14,700
Steel (1,000 tons)	4,231	4,251	5,927	17,600
Rolling mill products (1,000 tons)	3,506	3,408	4,288	13,000
Automobiles (units)	1,390	23,879	200,000
Chemical industry (millions rubles 1926/27 prices)	364	364	1,165	5,900

Second in importance only to total output is the geographical distribution of production within the Soviet borders in its bearing on defense capacity. The tremendous geographical expanses only scantily covered with a wide-meshed net of transport facilities has called for the development of local resources in each district to supply as far as possible local needs for fuel and food and common industrial products. It secondly requires the building of industrial centers close to sources of raw materials, to avoid long hauls of raw materials; and finally it calls for the establishment of bases of heavy industry in each large geographical division. The first move in this direction was the construction under the first Five-Year Plan of the Magnitogorsk—Kuznetsk iron and steel centers in Central Siberia to supplement the old centers in the Don Basin. The next step is now under way with the construction of a ferrous metallurgical center at Komsomolsk—the Amurstalstroï—and another just east of Lake Baikal at Petrovsko-Zabaikalsk. A parallel move in regard to the oil industry is the projected establishment under the third Five-Year Plan of a “second Baku” between the Volga and the Urals which will to some degree fill the enormous gap between the oil of the Caucasus and the oil of Soviet Sakhalin. In every phase of industry similar instances can be found where duplicate large-scale industrial centers have been built or are projected in various sections of the country. For example, the Kuibyshev hydroelectric

plant now being built on the Volga will be a second Dneprostroi, and around it will eventually develop a further industrial center based on its power. A map of the industrial construction to be undertaken in the next few years shows three large clusters of dots—the new plants of the Urals; those around Krasnoïarsk; and those of the Far East, centered at Komso-molsk. The effort to spread industrial activity to new regions can perhaps best be illustrated in the following table showing the distribution of the production of pig iron and rolling mill products.

IN PER CENT OF TOTAL PRODUCTION ⁵				
<i>Pig Iron</i>				
South	1913 73.6%	1927/28 72.8%	1932 69.8%	1937 63.3%
Central European Russia...	4.9	5.8	5.8	7.9
Urals	21.5	21.3	20.4	18.5
Siberia and Far East	0.1	4.0	10.3
<i>Rolling Mill Products</i>				
South	69.2%	63.9%	65.25%	57.65%
Central European Russia...	11.7	11.8	13.52	10.64
Urals	19.1	25.1	16.67	23.01
Siberia and Far East	0.2	0.56	8.7

The relative decline in the position of the South took place at the same time that the actual output of the mills of the Ukraine and Don Bas trebled. Similar statistics could be cited for the production of coal and electric power, tracing the shift to the east and the opening up of Central Asia.

Passing from industry to agriculture, the same processes can be seen in the efforts to have the level of agricultural development evened off throughout the country. Already the old distinctions between "producing" and "consuming" areas in large measure have lost their meaning, with the introduction of truck farming and dairying around the old industrial areas of northern European Russia. At the same time, the extension of grain production to the east and north is gradually eliminating the necessity of heavy grain shipments within the country.

The defense capacity of Soviet agriculture seems unquestionable. Organized almost entirely in large collective farms and state farms, and equipped with half a million tractors, Soviet agriculture in 1938 passed satisfactorily the severe test of a

5. "Voprosy Razmeshcheniia Chernoi Metallurgii," *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, No. 1, 1939, p. 70

drought year. As compared with the 1937 record crop, the harvest was somewhat smaller, but it remained well above the 1913 level—a bumper pre-war year. Preliminary totals are as follows: 105 million tons of grain; 18 million tons of sugar beets; 5 million tons of vegetable oil crops; and 3 million tons of cotton. In the matter of livestock alone improvement has been slow. Thanks to the increased use of machinery in agriculture, despite a 30 per cent increase in the sown area as compared with 1913, these levels of production can be maintained with a much diminished labor force so that Soviet agriculture also makes an annual contribution of some 1,500,000 workers to Soviet industry.

The redistribution of production and the expansion of transport facilities is at present beginning to eliminate the most serious remaining bottle-neck in Soviet economy. The figures for 1938 freight traffic were: 369.1 billion ton/km. carried by the railways and 66 billion ton/km. by water. At the present time daily carloadings range between 85,000 and 90,000. The extent of the changes being wrought in this all-important aspect of Soviet economy can be judged from the list of major transportation facilities which have been added during the last ten years: the Turk-Sib Railway, connecting central Siberia and the East with Central Asia; the Baltic-White Sea Canal; the Moscow-Volga Canal; the double tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway; the Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk branch line, giving a second outlet to the Pacific; the opening of the Northern Sea Route; and the large-scale development of civil airlines, which carried 31.7 million ton/km. in 1938 as compared with 3.1 million ton/km. in 1933.

With the completion of the second Five-Year Plan, the national economy of the USSR today, by and large, meets the points laid down by Voroshilov eleven years ago when the government was just inaugurating its program to refashion its whole economic pattern to fit the needs of a modern industrial country and to meet the urgent demands for national defense in the era of modern warfare. For the next five-year period, economic expansion is to continue on all fronts with stress on chemicals, high grade steel, industrial development of Eastern Siberia and the Far East, improvement of water transport

and the further exploitation of small-scale local fuel and power resources.

The Armed Forces and Defense

The army, navy and air force of the Soviet Union now number something over two million men, built up on the basis of universal military service. Military service begins at the age of 19 and as a rule is taken between what corresponds to high school and college education. The term of service varies from one to four years depending on the branch of the service and on the educational level of the recruit, for the Red Army in the past has served as the single largest educational organization in the country.

The organizational basis of the Soviet armed forces has undergone a number of important changes in the past few years. Most obvious of these changes was the establishment of a separate Commissariat of the Navy, in December 1936. More fundamental, however, has been the gradual shift toward eliminating the territorial basis of the army. Prior to 1935, 74 per cent of the army was in territorial divisions, where the training period of seven months was distributed over five years. But in that year the balance was reversed, so that 77 per cent of the army became regular (*kadrovyy*) divisions and at the present time, the territorial divisions have been completely abolished, as have the national units. The third important change was the reintroduction of Military Councils, giving the Military Commissars equal authority with the commanding officers. And, finally, a Supreme Military Council of eleven members was set up last year to act as the highest military authority of the country.

The commanding corps of the army is coming more and more to be made up of young men trained in Soviet military schools, which supplement the training courses given during the period of military service. Of these schools, the *uchilishche* is the most important type of formal military education. This is equivalent to the technical school or *tekhnikum* in other professions. There are more than 60 of these for the army, each one specializing in some particular branch of the service—infantry, artillery, tanks, electro-technology, military com-

munications and military engineering. In addition there are 32 schools for the air force and a like number for the navy. The place of these special schools in the military system is the training of the lower ranks of officers. The course, varying in length from one year to four according to speciality, is very much like the basic curriculum of the ordinary technical schools, with additional training in the military sciences, and the students on completion of the courses are prepared to enter universities or higher academies.

The higher military academies rank with the universities and other VUZes. There are 14 of them, again specializing on particular branches of the service, and they are supplemented by military faculties in some of the universities. The courses usually run five years and admission is open to persons between the ages of 17 and 35 who are serving more or less permanently in the armed forces. Through this extensive network of military schools, the Red Army and Navy are coming to have a highly expert staff of officers coming up through the ranks, at a rate of several thousand per year.

In the matter of equipment, the change in the Red Army and in the Soviet navy and air force has been as marked as in the industries on which it is based. The position of the Red Army in regard to equipment was relatively weak in 1928. As Voroshilov reported, the opening of the first Five-Year Plan found the Red Army with no machine guns except a small number of the old Maxim heavy standard type; no airplane or anti-aircraft guns; no artillery and no specialists capable of building up the artillery; no tanks; and an inadequate supply of munitions. A modest start had been made on the air force and on the submarine fleet. But the period from 1928 to 1933 was taken up in laying the bases in heavy industry for producing armaments. Under the second Five-Year Plan, the defense industries became increasingly important, until in January of this year, the Commissariat of Defense Industry, itself an independent Commissariat only since December 1936, was divided into four commissariats specializing in the manufacture of military equipment: the Commissariats of Aviation Industry, of Shipbuilding, of Munitions, and of Armaments.

The exact position of the Red Army's equipment naturally is not known. For 1936, the figure of 12 horse power per man

was given to indicate the degree of mechanization of the army, and certain foreign estimates of the equipment are available. In an article "La Lutte Aerienne" in *L'Oeuvre*, October 7, 1938, Pierre Cot, former French Minister of Aviation, estimated the comparative strength of the total Soviet air fleet, including both old and new planes, at a level of 240, taking the French air force as 100. The other nations were given as follows: England 100, Czechoslovakia 30, Germany 220 and Italy 100. As regards production potentials in case of war, again taking France as 100, he placed the USSR at 400, England at 150, Italy at 100 and Germany at 400. In his recent speech to the XVIII Party Congress, Voroshilov made some comparisons, as follows:

" . . . A Red Army infantry corps numbers about 60,000 men with a corresponding number of artillery pieces, tanks and other weapons. A single volley from the entire artillery force of a French infantry corps of three divisions weighs 6,373 kg. A German infantry corps of the same strength fires 6,078 kg. An artillery volley of a Red Army corps weighs 7,136 kg.

A French corps can release 51,462 kg. of artillery fire a minute, the German corps 48,769 kg. But the Soviet infantry corps can discharge 66,605 kg.

If we add to the artillery fire of the French corps the weight of mines, rifle grenades and bullets, we find that the French corps fires 60,981 kg., the German corps 59,509 kg. a minute and the Soviet corps 78,932 kg. a minute. . . ."⁶

Judging from various foreign reports, it seems fair to assume that the Soviet army is adequately equipped, both as regards quantity and quality of its armaments. Gedye's report on this point in his recent book, *Betrayal in Central Europe*, was "The efficiency factor of the Russian military forces has multiplied five times since the days of the Czar. So said the Czechoslovak experts, and they *had* to know. The recent purges removed "revolutionary" friends of politicians and allowed their replacement by loyal and disciplined officers. . . ." (p. 378) Concrete evidence of the efficacy of the Red Army was also presented at Changkufeng last August.

Civilian preparedness for defense is another part of the general Soviet program of national defense. The largest single organization through which this work is done is *Osoaviakhim*,

6. *Sunday Worker*. March 19, 1939.

founded in 1927 to promote the aviation and chemical industries. Its membership now exceeds 6 million and its activities include giving training in all phases of military life and defense—from flying and parachute jumping to sharpshooting and preparation for defense against air and gas attacks. In addition, the trade unions and social organizations have defense programs as well. Finally, outside of organizations, the whole population is urged to work to earn certain badges such as GTO (Ready for Labor and Defense) and PVKhO (Anti-aircraft and Chemical Defense) which signify the attainment of certain minimum standards of training. Considering that almost the entire male population goes through some formal military training, this civilian defense work rounds out the military training of the whole country. Its effectiveness has been exemplified in the large-scale defense maneuvers involving the entire populations of border cities such as Kiev, Leningrad and Vladivostok.

Foreign Policy and Defense

The role now being played by the third arm of Soviet defense—its foreign policy—was described by Commissar Litvinov in a speech to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, December 29, 1933.

"The guiding principle of our foreign policy has been put very briefly but very expressively by Comrade Stalin: We desire no foreign land, but we shall not surrender a single inch of our own land to anyone. Once we do not desire any foreign lands we cannot want war. As for our own land, we have every possibility of defending it and of preventing any attempt at its invasion. Our growing armed forces could teach a lesson to any of our near or distant neighbors which would prevent them for decades from again attempting to invade us, but this would be an unproductive waste of our means and energies. It would distract us for a time from our fundamental work of constructing socialism. We are therefore doing everything possible to defend our territory by peaceful means even though this may not be a radical means for removing the threat of aggression against us. We consider that even military activities commenced outside the immediate frontiers of our Union may be a menace to us, hence we not only continue but are intensifying our struggle for peace which has always been and still is the basic problem of our diplomacy. . . ."⁷

7. *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace*, Moscow, 1936. p. 96

In seeking to prevent the spread of war, the Soviet Union at different periods has had to use different methods and align with different countries. Stalin said in his political report in January 1934, "We never had any orientation toward Germany nor have we any orientation toward Poland and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation at the present time is toward the USSR. And if the interests of the USSR demand rapprochement with this or that country which is not interested in disturbing peace, we shall take this step without hesitation. . . . Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving peace and strengthening commercial relations with all countries. . . . Those who want peace and are striving for business intercourse with us will always receive our support. . . ."⁸

These two statements, although made several years ago, are still typical of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union at the present time and were repeated as recently as March of this year. It is perhaps worth while to review the steps taken by the Soviet government toward achieving these ends in foreign relations, as this indicates the manner in which foreign policy dove-tails into the whole national defense program of the country.

Collective security has been and still is the keystone of Soviet program for insuring peace—short of the attainment of universal total disarmament. Within this program falls the USSR's adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris, its entrance into the League of Nations, and its conclusion of non-aggression pacts with all its neighbors, except Japan (which has consistently refused to negotiate such a pact, first offered in 1932). And finally, the negotiation of regional mutual assistance pacts with France, Czechoslovakia and the Mongol People's Republic. In addition to these concrete steps toward erecting a system of security, the Soviet Union has made other, though unsuccessful, efforts toward the same end: its proposals for the amendment of the League Covenant to make it automatic and mandatory; Litvinov's statement to the

8. *The Soviet Union in The Struggle for Peace*, Moscow, 1936, p. 26-29

world on March 17, 1938, calling for a conference to prevent further aggression, at which time he specifically warned of the danger to Czechoslovakia if such steps were not taken; the Soviet's concrete offer of assistance to Czechoslovakia in accord with its obligations under the mutual assistance pact prior to the Munich settlement; its reply to President Roosevelt's letter on the eve of Munich in which the Soviet Foreign Office again stressed the necessity for a conference of the peace-loving powers; and, most recently, its reply to the enquiry from the British Government on March 18, 1939, regarding the position of the Soviet Union in view of the danger to Rumania. The Soviet Government proposed a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Poland, Rumania, Turkey and the USSR at which it would be possible to discuss the situation and to ascertain the positions of all the countries attending the conference. The suggestion was refused by the British Government as "premature."

In the specific war situations which have arisen over the past five years, Soviet policy has been to participate in all international efforts to deal with the war; to give assistance to the victims of aggression; to avoid as far as possible giving aid to the aggressors, directly or indirectly, but in all cases to avoid any action which might be seized upon as a *casus belli* to involve the Soviet Union in the war.

During the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Soviet diplomats took the lead in urging League of Nations sanctions against the aggressor nation, but it would not take unilateral economic action, in infringement of existing contracts with Italy, which, while failing to check Italian aggression, might have been seized upon as an unfriendly act. In the Spanish conflict, the USSR took part in the non-intervention agreement insofar as other nations lived up to its terms. When the plan failed, the Soviet Union gave direct material aid to the Spanish Government and pressed for international action such as that taken at Nyon to check further aggression. For China, besides being its most active advocate at Geneva, the Soviet Union has also been a source of necessary supplies. Conversely, as its contracts have lapsed, the USSR has cut its trade with Germany, Japan and Italy—as can be seen in the following table.

	(In thousands of rubles)			
	1936	1937	1937 (9 mos.)	1938 (9 mos.)
<i>Exports to</i>				
Italy	42,467	16,572	15,428
Germany	116,624	107,658	84,099	67,475
Japan	27,679	11,743	10,954	364
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	186,770	135,973	110,481	67,839
<i>Imports from</i>				
Italy	5,835	4,207	4,000	52
Germany	308,463	200,501	180,318	43,881
Japan	61,968	54,375	41,392	16,126
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	376,266	259,083	225,710	60,059

The Soviet government has also made use of economic and diplomatic reprisals as in the case of its refusal to sign a more advantageous fishing agreement with Japan after the announcement of the German-Japanese Anti-Communist Pact of 1936, and withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Hungary in 1939 when the latter adhered to the pact. On the other hand, the USSR has made economic and diplomatic gestures to its neighbors in Eastern Europe who find themselves isolated in the face of the Nazi advance and the policy of "appeasement" at present practised by Great Britain and France. Its position in regard to the annexation of Czechoslovakia by Germany was stated in a note to the German Ambassador in Moscow:

" . . . The Soviet Government cannot recognize the inclusion of Czechia and also, in one form or another, of Slovakia within the German Reich to be legitimate and in conformity with the generally accepted standards of international law and justice or the principle of the self-determination of nations.

"In the opinion of the Soviet Government the actions of the German Government, far from eliminating any danger to universal peace, have on the contrary created and enhanced this danger, violated the political stability in Central Europe, increased the elements of alarm previously created in Europe and dealt a fresh blow to the feeling of security of peoples. . . ."⁹

Conclusions

The three facets of the Soviet national defense program are bound together in the Soviet Constitution: Article 11 provides that "the economic life of the USSR is determined and directed

9. *New York Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1939.

by the state plan of national economy for the purpose of increasing the public wealth, of steadily raising the material and cultural level of the toilers and of strengthening the independence of the USSR and its power of defense"; Article 132 reads: "Universal military service is a law. Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honorable duty of the citizens of the USSR." And Article 49 gives the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR the right to declare war only in case of the military invasion of the USSR or in fulfillment of international obligations. In practice, the work of the three defense arms is coordinated not only through the Council of People's Commissars but also through the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) set up in 1920 out of the old Council of Workers' and Peasants' Defense to see that the interests of national defense are observed in every phase of Soviet activity.

The present European and Far Eastern crises find the Soviet Union behind a belt of fortified areas, guarded by an immense standing army and a reserve of civil population with considerable military training; equipped with an economy not only centralized in control and quickly convertible to exigencies of war, but also practically self-sufficient both in the raw materials and the industrial products that make up the sinews of modern warfare; and, finally, guided by a clearly defined foreign policy. To have such a three-ply insulation against war has always been the aspiration of the Soviet government, but only the last five years have finally brought the third and all-important economic element into play, furnishing both the material backing for the military machine and the starch for the morale of the people. The Red Army draws from a population whose standard of living is rapidly rising, judged by any yardstick of measurement and a population which has a basis for confidence in the foreign policy of its government, as a policy of defense, in the record of twenty difficult years filled with narrow escapes, quick settlements of incidents, resistance to provocation, avoidance of war and consistent effort to prevent war and firmness in the face of aggression. Such a foreign policy has been the guiding force in the whole national defense program of the Soviet Union, and it received its most

recent reaffirmation in Stalin's report to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party:

"The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and understandable: Firstly, we stand for peace and for the strengthening of commercial relations with all countries. This is our position and we will adhere to it as long as these countries maintain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they make no attempt to violate our country's interests. Secondly, we stand for peaceable, close and neighborly relations with all neighboring countries which have a common frontier with the USSR. This is our position and we shall adhere to it as long as these countries maintain identical relations with the Soviet Union, as long as they make no attempt to trespass directly or indirectly on the integrity and security of the frontiers of the Soviet state. Thirdly, we stand for the rendering of support to nations which have fallen prey to aggression and are fighting for the independence of their countries. Fourthly, we are not afraid of threats from aggressors and we are ready to retaliate with two blows for one against instigators of war who attempt to infringe on the integrity of Soviet borders.

"Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon: firstly, its growing economic, political and cultural strength; secondly, the moral and political unity of our Soviet society; thirdly, friendship between the peoples of our country; fourthly, its Red Army and Red Navy; fifthly, its policy of peace; sixthly, the moral support of the working people of all the countries to whom the preservation of peace is of vital concern; seventhly, the common sense of countries which for one reason or another are not interested in the violation of peace.

"The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are: 1. to pursue also in the future a policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries; 2. to be careful and not to allow our country to be involved in conflicts by instigators of war who are used to getting other people to pull their chestnuts out of the fire; 3. to strengthen the fighting power of the Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost; 4. to strengthen our international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries who are interested in peace and friendship between nations."

BLOOD TRANSFUSION IN THE USSR

By

REGINA WENDER FISCHER

The Soviet Union has been doing some very original work in the field of blood transfusion, valuable not only in peace time but of military importance. Leading in this research are three Moscow institutions—the Central Institute for Scientific Research in Hematology and Blood Transfusion, concerned mainly with donor blood; the Central Cancer and Tumor Institute, working mostly with placental blood; and the Sklif-fasov Institute, the biggest casualty and emergency hospital in the country, which utilizes only cadaver blood.

The use of placental and retroplacental blood, as well as that of cadaver blood, became possible as a result of the pioneer work of the Blood Transfusion Institute, which had worked out standardized methods of storing donor blood in banks up to a period of about three weeks. It is interesting to note that Soviet scientists in this field originally got their start from the works of American authors. They then forged ahead in the Soviet Union, with the result that today American hospitals are following the Soviet Union's example in giving up direct donor-to-patient transfusion, long obsolete in the Soviet Union, and instead founding blood banks along Russian lines.

When the Blood Transfusion Institute was first established, most of the medical institutions in Moscow made contracts with it to supply them on call with blood from the institute's blood bank. Soon, however, all the larger institutions had set up their own donor system and had their own blood banks. When some became dissatisfied with the donor system as too expensive and limited for mass transfusion work, placental and cadaver blood were "discovered."

The reason for this dissatisfaction is peculiarly bound up with the public health system in the Soviet Union. In the first place free hospitalization and pay during illness resulted in heavy demands for medical care. Secondly, with the general

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rise in the cultural level of the population, people began paying more attention to their health, applying for medical aid early enough so that operations were not yet too late. This applied particularly to patients with tumors and cancers. Widespread educational work among both the public and medical profession, plus the introduction of tumor specialists into the larger district clinics, brought many patients to the Cancer Institute for operation. The Skliffasov hospital, too, keenly felt the pressure of changing times—Moscow's widening streets, better telephone service, the new specially built ambulances which the automobile works had learned to manufacture, manned by personnel better trained and equipped than ever before—all these factors increased the number of patients who reached the hospital in time for emergency operations. Moreover, these two institutions not only served the Moscow district, but they were deluged with unusually difficult cases sent in by country doctors from all over the Union. More and more blood was needed for transfusion.

Not that donors can not be obtained, but only young people meeting very stringent health standards and who, in addition, have their regular jobs are allowed to act as donors. They are very well paid and are given special privileges in recognition of the honorable nature of their services. As a result, the donor department constitutes an expensive item in the budget of the medical institution. Money saved on this item could go for the purchase of other things needed, provided the standard of service remained high as before. It is therefore not surprising that these two institutions discovered placental and cadaver blood. They had every reason to, and it would be surprising if further sources were not uncovered by these or other institutions in the USSR. Most blood banks in the Soviet Union still operate on donor blood, but, following Moscow's lead, cadaver and placental blood are also being introduced all over the USSR.

Placental Blood for Large Transfusions

In the gynecological wards of the Cancer Institute there were several women obstetricians who also served in maternity hospitals¹. It was through these women physicians that the Cancer

1. It was and still is a fairly common practice for physicians to hold two jobs. This is possible because doctors work a four to six hour day at a full time job, on the one hand, and on the other hand because the demand for physicians is so great that for the present the practice must be condoned.

Institute first turned to placental blood in 1936. Some time previously the First Moscow Medical Institute had published reports of satisfactory results with placental blood obtained and used in one of their maternity hospitals. The blood had been obtained from the maternal free end of the umbilical cord after the infant's connection with it had been severed and the child removed. Blood so obtained is part of the foetal and not the maternal circulation, and it is no longer necessary to the child after its birth and separation from the cord. As far as the mother is concerned collecting this blood has no effect whatever, as very careful observation has shown. In their report the authors stressed that placental blood is one and a half times as rich as ordinary donor blood, having large amounts of calcium, copper and iron, containing various stimulating hormones, and having high red blood cell count and hemoglobin content. The maximum obtainable from a placenta was 200 cc (a glassful), the average amount being about half that. The authors therefore considered the use of placental blood limited to cases of small blood transfusions to stop a hemorrhage or to stimulate the patient's own blood-building organs. They thought the amount too small for transfusions where the primary aim was substitution, as in severe anemias caused by long, exhausting illness, malignant growths, or sudden loss of blood.

On the other hand, there had been a conference called by the Central Blood Transfusion Institute and attended by representatives from its branches all over the country. One of these latter reported on first experiments with utilizing for one patient the blood from several donors of different, though compatible, groups for the same patient. He had had to do this in an emergency and afterwards in experiments found it not only safe but even better than using blood from one donor alone. He said there were fewer reactions after transfusion because the various sources of blood balanced each other, smoothed out individual peculiarities and each supplied what the other lacked, just as the mixed milk supplied by an entire herd of cows is likely to be more satisfactory than that obtained from a single cow.

The obstetricians in the Cancer Institute put two and two together and decided to try pooling placental blood. And it

was a great success. A contract with a busy maternity hospital soon provided all the blood they could use, and they estimated, in a report published in 1937, that if all Moscow maternity hospitals would save their placental blood they could furnish enough blood for several thousand transfusions every year.

The technique of collecting the blood from the free maternal end of the umbilical cord after the child has been removed is so simple and easily learned that it usually is left to the attending midwife. The blood is allowed to flow into a small glass bottle containing sodium citrate and treated just as ordinary donor blood, remaining in the blood bank until needed.

The new source, at a fraction of donor blood cost, enabled comparatively lavish use of transfusion. Employing the continuous drip method, the Institute could easily afford to give anemic and often weak, elderly patients several quarts of blood before, during and after operation. Operations requiring several sessions of two or more hours each could be undertaken on patients formerly considered too poor risks, by building up their strength and blood supply with a whole series of transfusions until their condition was satisfactory for operation. Started as a supplement to the regular donor supply, the Institute now employs only placental blood.

Placental Blood Transfusions in Pediatrics

Last spring news of what the Cancer Institute was doing had reached one of the students at the First Moscow Medical Institute, who then persuaded the children's clinic of the school to try out placental blood for transfusion to infants. It seemed that as the amounts obtained from a single placenta were small, they were just the right size for children's doses. And placental blood itself is that of a child, so children's blood for children seemed reasonable enough. The Cancer Institute willingly furnished a few bottles a day from its large stock. Soon the pediatricians found themselves performing transfusions on their tiny patients much more frequently than before; the temptation to try it out was too much when it was so easy and cost so little. When notes were compared all agreed that the results were really excellent. Whether this is to be ascribed to the effect of the placental blood as such, as opposed to donor blood, or whether the results were due to the fact that frequent

transfusions simply strengthened the infants indirectly so that they could rally their powers of resistance and fight down the pneumonia, toxic dysentery, mastoid infection or whatever else they were suffering from, is not definitely established. It is difficult to reach conclusions on this matter because the clinic had never previously been so free with transfusions when using expensive donor blood. In any case, all agreed that the free use of placental blood transfusions had reduced the death rate, which is after all the important thing to them.

American data seems to indicate that the hemoglobin of placental blood differs radically from that of the adult or even of the young infant. What practical significance this has remains to be determined.

Another future field of action for placental blood is believed to be in hormone therapy, as this blood contains certain hormones, not all of which are fully investigated, but which are concerned with growth stimulation, etc. Extracts of placenta tissue have already been tried out.

Retroplacental blood, maternal (not foetal) blood which is lost as the result of the afterbirth, serves as stock material for sera used in treating measles and also for typing patients and donors. This blood is usually not collected sterilely and so is unfit for transfusion. However, the Russians have found that in about 60 per cent of all cases this blood too can be collected sterilely and is then suitable for transfusion purposes. The quantity obtainable is up to a pint and is otherwise lost by the mother anyway.

With a wartime situation in which all donor blood collected goes to the front it is conceivable that placental and retro-placental blood might serve as auxiliary sources in the rear.

Cadaver Blood

The Soviet Union's greatest advance in the field of blood transfusion is, probably, Professor Sergei Judin's utilization of cadaver blood. Since his first daring experiment, the method has been perfected and now only cadaver blood is used for transfusions in his hospital, the biggest emergency and casualty hospital in the country. The technique is simple, requiring nothing more than tapping the jugular and caval veins through

a small incision at the neck.² The quantity obtained from a single cadaver is as much as six or ten donors could give—three to five quarts. Cadaver blood's most remarkable feature, accidentally discovered by Judin's woman assistant surgeon Skundina, is that it reliquefies after an initial period of coagulation. In this it differs radically from blood obtained from living sources. This process, known as fibrinolysis, occurs without the aid of any chemicals, and consequently it is not necessary to add sodium citrate to cadaver blood, as must be done with donor, placental, retroplacental or any other "living" blood to prevent coagulation. This is important because it cuts down the possibilities for contamination of the blood, as well as greatly simplifying the technique involved. Further, since fibrinolysis occurs only with blood of previously healthy persons meeting sudden death, a check is provided against using the blood of diseased persons. Should cadaver blood fail to reliquefy after initial coagulation it neither can nor ought to be used. This is an automatic check better than physical examination of the living donor, where in spite of all the care taken, literature does record cases where disease was transferred by transfusion from donor to recipient. This has never yet happened with cadaver blood.

Previous to Professor Judin's work, it was popularly assumed that cadaver blood was toxic, containing poison, liberated through the disintegration of the body tissues in death. Professor Judin was convinced from experimental work performed by himself and his friend on dogs that cadaver blood was not toxic. However, he felt he would be morally justified in trying this new source only in an emergency when there was no donor blood at hand and none could be secured in time. Judin's chance came when late one night two cases were brought into the receiving room at Skliffasov—one, an old man, expired; the other, a young man who had slashed his wrists in attempting suicide and was already unconscious and rapidly sinking, due to loss of blood. There was no donor blood available, and typing showed that the old man's blood could be used. Judin succeeded in collecting the blood barely in time to transfuse it. In fact he could not stop to collect the full

2. It is reported that still simpler technique was used in Spain by Dr. Saxton, a British surgeon. The blood was drawn from the arm veins with an ordinary hypodermic syringe.

amount because of urgent calls from the operating room that the young patient was in his last extremity. Cautiously and slowly, the cadaver blood was injected into the would-be suicide's vein, and in the suspense that followed he opened his eyes. The first experiment turned out well. Fortunately subsequent Wasserman and autopsy examination showed the "donor" to have been free from syphilis. After this, a routine system was set up whereby no cadaver blood was ever used until the double check of a Wasserman test and an autopsy definitely excluded syphilis as well as other diseases.

Coroners' Objections

A further difficulty in Judin's path was that, as in the Soviet Union autopsies are compulsory in all deaths, physicians and pathologists complained that the removal of so much blood would affect the internal organs and hinder correct post mortem diagnoses. However, Judin proved that the coroners were unable to distinguish at autopsy between bodies from which blood had been collected and those which had not been touched. This is because all the blood collected comes, not from the internal organs, but from the caval veins, draining the arms, legs and head. This was proved experimentally when coloring matter injected into the blood vessels draining the internal organs—the portal system—failed to appear in blood collected from the jugular veins, part of the caval system.

Besides being important for autopsies, this experiment explained why it is that infection from the lower intestinal tract, which is the source of the infection that spreads over the body and finally causes its decay after death, does not have to be feared when blood is collected soon after death: There is no direct communication between the portal and caval systems. However, a six hour limit for collecting blood is set because at about this time bacteria begin to cross through the tissues of the intestinal tract and thence gradually infect the blood.

Once it was proved that cadaver blood is not toxic and that its removal did not affect the accuracy of autopsy diagnoses, there was no further difficulty. The Sklifasov Institute has already performed over 2,500 transfusions with cadaver blood and its blood bank is built entirely on what it obtains from its own receiving room.

The use of cadaver blood in this country might fill a definite

need felt by all city and charity hospitals for a cheaper source of blood than donors. In theory, if a charity patient needs a transfusion the hospital pays for it, but of course this is necessarily limited by the budget. Undoubtedly a cheap, easily accessible source such as cadaver blood would prove a boon to both patient and physician. As the cadaver blood method is known here and has been tried and proved in the Soviet Union it is curious that it has not come into practice in this country.

It seems likely that it is legal rather than any other difficulties which hinder the introduction of cadaver blood banks into the United States, just as legal difficulties hinder the general practice of autopsies, of such great educational and scientific importance. If, as with autopsies, it is first necessary to obtain the consent of the relatives before blood can be taken from a cadaver, the cadaver blood method will remain impossible of attainment in this country, no matter how great the need for it. As all the suitable cases are sudden deaths, often by the time the person could be identified and the relatives found and persuaded to give their permission, the six-hour limit would be up many times over.

From a military standpoint cadaver blood offers inestimable advantages, eliminating as it does the transport problem. This question, so essential with donor blood being sent from the rear to the front, has no deciding importance here. Breakage, spoilage, injury from excessive jolting, delays due to the difficulties of transport in war are all avoided. The source is on the spot.

Fibrinolysis

Much remains to be done to perfect the cadaver blood method, not so much from the practical angle as from the theoretical side. All efforts to explain the phenomenon of fibrinolysis have so far met with failure. This is not surprising when one considers the nature of the question—what change takes place at the moment when the dividing line between life and death is crossed? This is well illustrated by a case which occurred in Judin's wards:—A young man brought in after an accident was seen obviously to be in his last agony, practically dead. However, by some miracle, determined interference managed to save him. A small sample of blood taken at the time of his admission to the hospital was afterwards discovered

to have reliquefied after initial coagulation, behaving exactly like cadaver blood. A few weeks later with the patient on his feet and well again, another sample of blood was taken, but it no longer fibrinolized. Once coagulated it remained so indefinitely just as ordinary blood. Thus, whatever the explanation of fibrinolysis, it is connected with some process, reversible in its early stages, occurring at the moment of death. Only further delving will solve this fascinating problem, and the Russians are hard at work on it.

Another question that will bear further study is what is the maximum time after death when blood can still be considered sterile and safe to collect for transfusion. The Russians set this limit at six hours, for the time being, but think that as experience accumulates it may become possible to set longer time limits. This depends to a large extent on the state of the weather—cold and dry being more favorable than hot and wet. However, fundamentally, all depends on the cause of death, provided the subject was previously in good health. Death from small bullet wounds, death by hanging, fracture of the base of the skull, heart failure and similar causes provide the sources of cadaver blood less likely to introduce infection into the bloodstream than torn, open wounds involving large blood vessels. In the latter type of wounds even six minutes may be too long, and such cadavers are not utilized at all.

Another important problem requiring study is that of proper containers. Along this line the Russians have done much standardizing and simplifying; working out designs for wooden transport boxes, which hold their own temperature regardless of outside heat or cold and which may be thrown down in parachutes, etc. However, nothing but glass or metal has as yet been used for the actual containers in Russia or Europe; and glass bottles are bulky, fragile, heavy and require a complicated process of washing before being reused. Metal is still worse, since the condition of the blood cannot be seen at a glance. It is conceivable that the United States, which leads the world in its variety of packing materials, might be able to find some material, like cellophane, having all the good qualities of glass but being more practical for both peace time and military purposes.

Mention should be made of another problem in which the

Russians are extremely interested, one which has been the bane of transfusion since it first came into practice—the possibility of transferring disease along with the blood, chiefly syphilis, also malaria, as well as various other diseases. Constant supervision and testing is required—a time-consuming and expensive affair in dealing with many donors, maternity cases or cadavers, whatever the source. Unfortunately, in times of stress no adequate check on syphilis can be made. A donor healthy yesterday may be sick today and the Wasserman reaction will still be negative. During wartime, syphilis is frequently found. Donors in the Spanish republican side were not examined but had only to sign statements that they were in good health, according to an article in the September, 1937, issue of the English medical journal, *The Lancet*. Soviet scientists say that experiments on rabbits have so far shown that syphilitic blood loses its contagiousness after a few days standing, or if treated with quinine, within three days time. Should further study in the Soviet Union or America confirm this, it would mark the end of one of blood transfusion's greatest dangers. Malarial blood, they say, can also be safely used after 10 days' standing in the blood bank. The latter is likewise a matter of great importance, if confirmed, as there are certain sections where malaria is so common that unless malarial blood can be used hardly a donor is to be found.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union's first steps in the field of blood transfusion were made after the publication of the works of American authors. Since then the Russians have forged rapidly ahead, having worked out the organization and methods of blood banks. It is only within the last year or two that blood banks have been introduced into the United States, this time returning from Russia. To date, only three large institutions have blood banks in this country, the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, the Philadelphia General Hospital, and the Bellevue Hospital in New York. There is no reason why blood banks should not become as widely distributed in the United States as they are in the Soviet Union. For the best medical care many more blood transfusions will have to be performed than are now possible. Establishment of blood banks, utilizing not only donor blood, but cadaver, placental and retroplacental blood as well, offers a solution.

THE SOVIETS REFORM YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS

By

NATHAN BERMAN

When the Soviets came to power twenty-one years ago they inherited from the old regime an aggravated juvenile delinquency situation. Available data indicates that between 1900 and 1910, crime among juveniles more than doubled. It nearly doubled again between 1913 and 1916. These juvenile offenders, almost all guilty of offenses against property, were detained, both while awaiting trial and after sentence, in common jails, prisons, and, to a smaller degree, in monasteries. There was no attempt made to segregate them from the adult and more hardened offenders. Nor were there any provisions made for their education or training while behind the bars.

Progressive juvenile delinquency treatment was unknown in old Russia. Where some reform was attempted, it was more a matter of form than of method. The first juvenile court was established in Russia in 1910 and by 1917 there were six such courts in the entire Russian Empire. The attitude toward these courts was exemplified by Mr. A. K. Akunev, Russia's first juvenile court judge, who explained that the juvenile courts "cannot and must not serve to weaken the repressive measures applied to children who are bound upon the path of crime."

While the Soviet approach to the young offender constituted a complete break with that of the old regime, the actual problem continued to be acute for a long time. Civil War and Intervention continued on many fronts until about 1922 and the vast Russian land, which had already experienced over three years of costly and bloody war, was further subjected to suffering and deprivation. As a result, the energies of the country were strained primarily for purposes of defense and the maintenance of some economic equilibrium. The youth, many of whom were orphaned, were drifting, constantly swelling the ranks of the way-

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ward and delinquent. Then came the famine of 1921: the country, whose populace had already been worn thin by the years of war, suffered the greatest famine of modern times. Along the Volga River alone—the area hardest hit—the famine affected some twenty-five million people, including eight million children. Under the lash of stark starvation, virtually millions of children took to the roads and scattered all over the vast land. They constituted the *bezprizornie* or homeless ones. Although many of these children perished of hunger, neglect and disease, the great majority of them survived, existing upon whatever they could lay their hands on. They continued this precarious and anti-social existence for a number of years until, in the latter twenties, the Soviet government took energetic steps to “liquidate” this embarrassing and destructive problem.

At its height, the problem of the *bezprizornie*—delinquent youth—was a matter of serious concern to the Soviet government, even though it was recognized as a temporary phenomenon, an inevitable result of a period of warfare. And what irked the authorities particularly was that they were forced to resort, even though temporarily, to methods of treatment which were out of step with the Soviet philosophy of crime and delinquency. In order immediately to detain, shelter and segregate these hordes of wild and anti-social youth, make-shift accommodations, ancient monasteries and even some of the much hated Tsarist prisons had to be used. Attempts to overcome idleness in places of detention were not always successful because of general lack of equipment and proper personnel. Furthermore, since Russia had practically no trained welfare personnel, the job of dealing with such children was often handled crudely and incompetently. Literature covering the subject in the early and middle twenties shows the sharp discrepancy between good intentions and sound theory on one hand and the lack of practical possibilities for applying them on the other.

But as time progressed, the Soviet Union managed to handle this problem with growing success. The progress made in this direction during the last fifteen years—since the famine—constitutes the subject of the remaining paragraphs.

While there are several types of correctional or reform institutions for the young in the Soviet Union, there are certain fea-

tures that in varying degrees are characteristic of all of them.

Employment of a productive nature is universal in all institutions. With scarcity of labor still felt in every field of endeavor, industrial production in places of incarceration is welcome for material as well as for rehabilitating reasons. For the most part, such work is usually financially remunerative in addition to keeping the inmates occupied and providing vocational training. In the more advanced institutions, such as the open "communes," (to be discussed below), the wages paid are in accordance with the general union scales. While "serving time," the youth in the Soviet correctional institution is thus made to feel that he is also helping to "build socialism."

Self-government in varying degrees is another accepted feature in these institutions. The Soviet penal policy aims to place as much responsibility and initiative on the inmates as circumstances permit. Such arrangements range from limited inmate cooperation to practically complete inmate self-management of the institution.

In addition to such forms of expression as sports, music, and various types of cultural activity, every Soviet correctional institution for adults as well as for adolescents issues its own newspaper. Each institution has its own "wall newspaper" posted periodically for general reading as the product of the inmates themselves. In addition to these publications, a growing number of large institutions print regular weekly or even daily newspapers, the circulation of which extends beyond the boundaries of the community in question. These publications, in addition to reflecting every phase of institutional life, also devote a good deal of space to national and international events. Their chief contribution has been to stimulate production, promote social participation and interaction, and to encourage self-criticism and criticism of the administration. The publications of the Soviet correctional institutions thus serve as a very potent socializing influence.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the Soviet Union's correctional set-up is the provision of "after care." No "graduate" is released without arranging for his employment or vocational future. Long before he is due to leave, plans are made for his further employment, training or education. If his inclination

and record so indicate, he is given an opportunity for higher educational and professional specialization. Through this policy Soviet correctional institutions are directly responsible for having converted a substantial number of erstwhile anti-social and illiterate people into scientists, artists and leading industrial specialists.

As illustration of the above features, data on a number of institutions visited by the author can be given. Because of space limitation, only high points may be touched upon here.

The Dzerzhinski Reform School

The reform school named after Dzerzhinski, located a few miles from the Tomsk Railway Station near Moscow, is under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of Education. It is built on a cottage plan with no walls or bars and closely resembles an American industrial school. It accommodates about 150 boys charged with petty thievery or persistent truancy. Their ages range from about 12 to 16 years and their intelligence from borderline mental defective to superior.

The day is divided between school room and shop. Successful completion of the shop work entitles the boy to a Master certificate which admits him as a skilled worker in a similar line of work in regular industry.

The boys received pay for the work they perform. In a given month, 32 boys earned a total of 1900 rubles, or an average of about 60 rubles per month. Of the money earned 50 per cent went towards the individual's savings account, and the rest was distributed among various funds including spending-money and a fund for the especially needy graduates. The savings accounts examined by the author ranged from the 16 rubles of a new boy to 300 rubles of an old-timer.

In offering wages for the work performed by these youngsters, the Soviets are quite mindful of the psychological value of earning. To the majority of the boys the wages received at the institution constitute the first earned income they have had. It means the first taste of independence. Many a boy who had resolved to get away from the school at the first opportunity changed his mind with the receipt of the first pay envelope, no-matter how slim it may have been.

The effectiveness of the wall newspaper as a means of social control was demonstrated at the same school. Gavrusha, a tough sulkily adolescent, proved quite a problem to the school because of his chronic negligent conduct and appearance. One of the boys wrote a critical article about him in the "Dzerzhinets." No sooner was the paper posted than the article disappeared and with it, part of the mat. Since no one saw the act perpetrated, no one could be blamed. When the next issue came out, it contained a rough caricature of Gavrusha, showing him knife in hand, a mean look on his face, cutting up the newspaper. Nothing happened to this issue, but the subsequent report showed that Gavrusha mended his ways of living quite markedly.

The Iksha Commune

Commune Iksha is also located in the country in the Moscow area. It was under the jurisdiction of the Commissariat of the Interior (G.P.U. Division) which meant that it was set aside for the socially neglected children. It was established as a commune in which boys, who had previously been held in "walled in" institutions, could be given an opportunity to work out their problems in an open self-administering community. There were 166 such children in the commune at the time of the author's visit, the vast majority of whom ranged in age from 12 to 17 years, with a handful of older children. Some were *bezprizornie* arrested on the streets or in railway stations, and others were petty thieves transferred from a closed institution. All were young in years, but of considerable criminal experience.

Iksha was at that time a newly created institution. It was only a few weeks old when the severe Russian winter set in and paralyzed all construction and building activities. The place was therefore inadequate in a number of respects. It looked like a modest pioneer camp. The staff consisted of a handful of people, mostly working in the capacity of pedagogues and vocational instructors. At the time, they were away from the Commune most of the day trying to get supplies and equipment for the place, and the Commune was run almost entirely by the boys through democratically elected committees.

In the evening, with the school work and the evening meal out of the way, the Committee on Leaves met. The little club

room was packed with applicants and spectators. Several of the boys were asking permission to go to Moscow for the week-end. The committee scrutinized the applicants' records. What were their weaknesses? When were they last in the city? How were they conducting themselves at the Commune? The questions and discussion were handled in a business-like manner. Some of the applications were turned down and the reasons explained. Others were allowed to go. When leave was granted, the boys were warned not to commit any infractions, such as getting drunk, because not only would that reflect on them but also on the good name of the Commune. As fellow "communars" each bore responsibility for the whole group.

Next the Committee on Admissions met. Two applicants were up for consideration. The first was a sandy-haired, shifty-eyed Russian adolescent. The members of the committee examined his papers—he had to be a fellow with a record to be eligible here. His papers seemed to be in order ("Let me see it—they are all right," said an ex-forgery). When the applicant was asked some questions as to where he spent his time before he came there, his intentions and the like, his replies were contradictory and confusing. There was a slight commotion, and one of the committee members pounded on the table, and in his indignation, fell into the underworld lingo. "The candidate is not coming clean." The decision: Application deferred until the next meeting, at which time the candidate should get his facts straight. In the meantime he could remain in the Commune.

The other candidate was a swarthy, timid-looking Tartar boy. Here the process was easy. The documents were in order, his statements convincing and the conduct of the candidate very satisfactory. Application was forthwith accepted.

Bolshevo

The Bolshevo Commune, also under the supervision of the G.P.U., like a number of others of its kind is built around pre-discharged and discharged prisoners. Residence is restricted to people with a "past" who voluntarily prefer to make this their home. They may, when approved by a special committee, get married, raise a family and bring over their immediate relatives

to live with them. In appearance, Bolshevo is very much like any other prospering Soviet village. It has all the necessities, conveniences and features of an industrial community.

Self-administration has been attained there to the highest degree. All activities, from handling disciplinary infractions to industrial production, are managed by the "inmates." Life is regulated by means of administrators, committees and general assemblies. There is a minimum of self-imposed restrictions to which all are subject. One of the cardinal elements is work. To live in the commune one has to be productive and his pay is in accordance with his production.

Considering the element of population from which the people of Bolshevo came, peculiar disciplinary problems occasionally arise. The manner in which they are handled explains the popularity of the commune. Two cases are cited below as examples.

Misha, a tough underworld character, was influenced by his friends to join them in the commune. After a trial stay, he decided that he wished to remain there. When it came up before the Committee on Admissions, a hitch developed. Misha refused to work. He never worked in his life and did not see why he should begin now. Both sides refused to yield on this point. The decision arrived at was that he be given time to think the matter over. At the next meeting the same thing repeated itself. Then, in desperation, some asked, "But what would you like to do?" He replied, haltingly, that he used to have a yen for the brush and paint. So be it. Several years later Misha still had not worked. But instead, he had produced numerous oil paintings and water colors of a very fine quality, and his exhibits are the pride of the commune.

Kolya had the same experience. No work for him either. But he had an obsession for pigeons. No fence was too high, no steeple too risky for him to chase after these birds. So Kolya was permitted to make pigeons his vocation. Under his able management, Bolshevo has been training some of the finest commercial and military pigeons in the country.

It is for reasons such as this, perhaps, that the communes have graduate scientists, industrial experts, and artists of high calibre. It is also because of this type of approach that out of a thousand eligible to leave the institution, only two per cent did so; the rest remained to "build socialism" at the commune

which for them marked the end of crime and the beginning of useful living.

Why do the Soviets foster and encourage this type of approach to the delinquent and criminal? The answer is simple. They adopt this method because it works. The Soviets know, as good social workers everywhere maintain, that one can accomplish more through socializing the delinquent and wayward than through brutalizing him.

SERGE PROKOFIEV

His Status in Soviet Music

By

NICOLAS SLONIMSKY

The music of Serge Prokofiev is probably the greatest single influence in Soviet music. Prokofiev belongs to the middle generation, standing between the composers who, like Glière and Vassilenko, were well known before the Revolution, and composers like Shostakovich, whose formative years were spent under the Soviet Regime. While pre-Revolutionary composers had to be "naturalized" as Soviet musicians, Prokofiev's music fitted without strain into the scheme of "socialist realism," as the Soviet catch-word describes the essence of Soviet music. The evolutionary catalogue of Prokofiev's works shows an extraordinary constancy of purpose. There are no sudden changes of style, no incursions into self-denying classicism or sweeping modernism. There are no recantations, no "returns to Bach." Instead, there is a creative self-assertion. In the early years of the Soviet Republic, musicians were apt to speculate on whether this or that composer was "consonant" with the spirit of the new nation born of revolution. Of contemporary composers, there were few who were as close in spirit to the new music of the masses as Prokofiev's cheerfully lyrical muse. Yet Prokofiev was a Westerner. He went eastward around the world in 1918, and he did not revisit Russia until 1927. As a concert pianist and conductor of his own works, he was a familiar figure in Paris, Berlin, London, and New York. Diaghilev, acting entirely outside of Russia, has produced the majority of Prokofiev's ballets. Prokofiev's first Soviet composition, *Le Pas d'Acier*, was largely a Westerner's conception of the march of industrial life in Soviet Russia. It was "pro-Soviet" music, if music can be pro or con, but it touched only on the external life of the Soviet Union. But in the same year when *Le Pas d'Acier* was produced by Diaghilev in Paris, Prokofiev went to Russia on a concert tour. The reception accorded to him was unmistakable: Prokofiev was

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accepted as a truly Soviet composer, even though working in France. In 1934, Prokofiev settled permanently in Moscow, without abandoning his annual visits to Europe and America.

Throughout this period, between his first tour in Russia and his final settlement in Moscow as a Soviet composer, Prokofiev's music underwent subtle changes in a direction away from the constructivist ideal of the European theater and towards the self-sufficient design of romantic realism, the realism of human emotion. Distilling the three chief ingredients of his musical essence, dynamism, lyricism, and sarcasm, Prokofiev has formed a style with less sarcasm than in early works, while enhancing the lyric power, and leaving his youthful dynamism undiminished.

Prokofiev's creative biography starts at a very early age. He attempted to write an opera at the age of nine. The title was *The Giant*, and it was in three acts and six tableaux, the libretto by the composer. It was written in piano score, and the vocal line followed the melody of the right hand. His second juvenile opera, *Desert Island*, was partly scored for the orchestra by the ten-year-old Prokofiev, who by now was already taking regular lessons from Glière. At twelve he wrote a complete score of *Feast During the Plague* to Pushkin's story. Soon he entered the Petrograd Conservatory, where he studied composition with Rimsky-Korsakov and Liadov, piano with Essipova, and conducting with Cherepnin. He graduated in 1914, winning the grand prize, a Bechstein piano. As a pianist, however, he did not pursue an independent career and has appeared almost exclusively in recitals of his own works. In the field of conducting, too, he has been the interpreter of his own music in his public appearances. After his graduation, he appeared on the Petrograd and Moscow stage as a new *enfant terrible*, scaring his old professors with novel devices, and stimulating the young comrades-in-arms by his daring. There was an element of mischief in Prokofiev's early piano pieces, a boyish defiance of rules and regulations. Counterpoint for counterpoint's sake and the entire stock of pedantic scholarship had little appeal for Prokofiev. In fact, he has never composed a straight-forward fugue outside of the class-

room, and the fugal element is practically absent from his symphonic works.

His first work of major importance is his *Scythian Suite* (1914). The inspiration of this suite derives from pre-Slavic Russia, and there is an overabundance of rhythm and flowing melody. Of course, the work was extremely "modern" for the time, and Prokofiev, as all modernists, came in for a share of violent opprobrium. One Moscow critic, himself a composer, in his desire to squelch Prokofiev, made a fatal blunder: without attending the scheduled concert in Moscow, he delivered a blast in his daily paper against the atrocities of the new work, and concluded his review by saying: "The composer himself conducted the work with barbaric abandon." The misfortune of the critic was the fact that the performance had been cancelled at the last moment, due to the stringencies of wartime. The only manuscript score was in the hands of the composer, so the critic could not plead an earlier acquaintance with the work. This episode, which illustrates the danger of condemning new music without a hearing, did much to arouse interest in Prokofiev's work in wartime Russia. A few years later, during the early days of the Revolution, Prokofiev wrote his *Classical Symphony*, a work which adheres to the classical form and the classical tonality, but in which the humor, the dynamic power, and the lyric quality are typically Prokofiev's. The popular Gavotte from this symphony has twentieth century charm, and the deceptive modulations add tinge to the old form. During the same period that the *Classical Symphony* was composed, Prokofiev wrote the powerful incantation *Seven, They are Seven*, to the ancient Sumerian legend. Scored for a large orchestra, chorus, and tenor solo, it can be cited as Prokofiev's most "leftist" work, if we take the word "leftist" as signifying extreme modernism fed on dissonance. Obviously Prokofiev was in search of a style. He had already proved that he was capable of expressing himself along the entire range of harmonic idioms, from the classical to the ultra-modern. Now it was a question of synthesis. In his symphonies subsequent to the *Classical Symphony*, he made his choice plain. His style was to be what we have called romantic realism. The harmonic idiom, as now established, was tonal and modal, with chromaticism only as a useful adjunct, never

an extension into post-Wagnerian atonality. It is curious that Prokofiev shuns impressionism and prefers literal pictorialism, often with an ironic twist. Prokofiev's ballets, which are the product of his Paris period, are often literal in illustrating the action, but never vaguely impressionistic. At the same time, the musical material of the ballets is rich enough to be used symphonically, without the theater. In his Fourth Symphony, Prokofiev uses themes from his ballet *The Prodigal Son* as subjects in the classical sonata form. Also, the symphonic suites from his ballets and operas lose little from the absence of stage action.

In his five piano concertos, Prokofiev has created a new type of virtuoso style, percussive and lyrical at the same time. The pianoforte technique in these concertos occupies the intermediate position between the classical concerto and the modern use of piano obbligato. But even in his symphonic compositions the piano plays a prominent part among the instruments of the orchestra. Prokofiev was equally successful in his two concertos for the violin. While the First Concerto still reflects the style of Russian academicism, the Second Violin Concerto embodies the best traits of Prokofiev's new style, characterized by a perfect proportion of lyrical and dynamic power. A concerto for cello and orchestra was presented for the first time during the decade of Soviet music in Moscow in November, 1938.

The recent trend in Soviet music towards the formation of a style, national in its inspiration, has moved Prokofiev to write an *Overture on Russian Themes*. His music to the film *Alexander Nevsky* also belongs to the category of the new national period. Prokofiev has made a symphonic suite from this music. He has also made a symphonic suite from the music to the film *Lieutenant Kizhe*. The story is about the mad Tsar Paul, who misread a Russian expletive, and conferred on that part of speech a military order, an imperial slip which could not be revealed by the courtiers without incurring a possible disgrace. So, the loyal henchmen created a mythical personage to be endowed with all the properties of a living subject of the Tsar, i.e., the passport and a record of faithful service. The music is satirical and Prokofiev here finds an occasion to use his best extravaganza style.

Perhaps the most novel of Prokofiev's later work is his Symphonic Fairy Tale for children, *Peter and the Wolf*, written for production at the Children's Theater in Moscow in 1936. It introduces a narrator, telling the story of the Red Pioneer, Peter, who, over the objection of a grouchy grandfather, sets forth on the adventure of conquering the Russian equivalent of the Big Bad Wolf. Peter is aided by a bird, a cat, and a duck, but while using them as allies, he has to be on the lookout for the cat, who has designs on the bird. The duck eventually falls victim of the wolf, but remains alive even in the wolf's belly, while the wolf is being triumphantly carried off to the zoo. The interesting feature of this work is the use of instrumental leitmotifs, so that the grandfather is portrayed by a bassoon, the bird by a flute, the cat by a clarinet, the wolf by horns, and Peter by a romantically adventurous theme in the strings. The principle of literal illustration is here carried to its ultimate clarity. In fact, the device is elementary, and no attempt is made to Wagnerize the procedure. The narrator tells the story, and with every mention of the principals, an instrument plays the corresponding motive. Naturally, the music finds great favor among Russian children. It is even more remarkable that it has become an outstanding success with the sophisticated symphony audiences in America.

At forty-eight, Prokofiev is in a fortunate position among composers of the day. His music is accepted, not only by the sophisticates of the modern world, but by a great majority of listening audiences, both in Russia and abroad. In his native land, he holds no academic courses and teaches at no conservatory, but his influence on young Soviet musicians is profound. There is a sense of mental health that pervades Prokofiev's music, which makes him a factor in the movement towards musical optimism.

List of Works of Serge Prokofiev

- Op. 1 *First Sonata* for piano, in F minor (1909)
 2 *Four Etudes* for piano (1909)
 3 *Four pieces* for piano: *Conte—Badinage—Marche—Fantôme* (1907-11)
 4 *Four pieces* for piano: *Réminiscences—Élan—Désespoir—Suggestion diabolique* (1908-12)
 5/48 *Sinfonietta* for orchestra (1909-29)
 6 *Rêves* for orchestra (first performance, Moscow, Dec. 20, 1916)
 7 *The Swan and the Wave* to words by Balmont, for two female choruses with orchestra
 8 *Esquisse automnale* for orchestra
 9 Two poems for voice and piano: *Il est d'autres planètes* (1910), *La barque démarre* (1911)
 10 *First Concerto* for piano, in D flat major (1911)
 11 *Toccata* for piano (1911)
 12 Ten pieces for piano: *Marche* (1908-13)—*Gavotte* (1908-10)—*Rigaudon* (1913)—*Mazurka* (1909)—*Caprice* (1913)—*Légende* (1913)—*Prélude* (1913)—*Allemande* (1913)—*Scherzo humoristique* (1912)—*Scherzo* (1912)
 13 *Magdalene—opera* (1911-13)
 14 *Second Sonata* for piano, in D minor (1912)
 15 *Ballade* for violoncello and piano (1912)
 16 *Second Concerto* for piano, in G minor (first version, 1913; second version completed in Ettal, Germany, on Oct. 12, 1923)
 17 *Sarcasmes—piano cycle* (1912-14)
 18 *The Ugly Duckling*, for voice and piano (1914)
 19 *First Concerto* for violin and orchestra, in D major (1913-23; first performance Oct. 18, 1923, Paris)
 20 *Scythian Suite* for orchestra (1914; first performance Jan. 29, 1916, Petrograd)
 21 *Buffon* (Chout)—ballet (first version completed 1915; revised 1920; orchestrated between July 21, 1920, and April 20, 1921, in France; first performance May 17, 1921, Paris)
 22 *Visions fugitives* for piano (1915-17)
 23 Five poems for voice and piano: *Sous le toit—De gris vêtue—Suis-Moi sans crainte—Dans mon jardin—Le sorcier* (1915)
 24 *The Gambler—opera* (libretto begun Oct. 12, 1915; first version of orchestral score began on June 10, 1916, at Kuokkala, Finland, and completed on Feb. 4, 1917, at St. Petersburg; second version of orchestral score begun on Sept. 9, 1927, at St. Palais, France, and completed on Feb. 29, 1928, at Paris)
 25 *Classical Symphony* for orchestra (1916-17; first performance Apr. 21, 1918, Petrograd)
 26 *Third Concerto* for piano, in C major (1917-21, orchestrated between Aug. 1, 1921, and Sept. 28, 1921, in Rochelets; first performance Dec. 16, 1921, Chicago)
 27 Five songs, to words by Anna Akhmatova: *Dans la chambre la poussière d'or—La sincère tendresse—Souvenir du soleil—Bonjour—Le roi aux yeux gris* (1916)
 28 *Third Sonata* for piano, in A minor (1907-17)
 29 *Fourth Sonata* for piano, in C minor (1908-17)
 30 *Sept, ils sont sept—cantata* (first sketches Sept. 4 to Sept. 15, 1917, near St. Petersburg; sketches of orchestral score Nov. 10 to Dec. 13, 1917, at Kislovodsk; orchestral score copied and corrected Dec. 25, 1917, to Jan. 13, 1918, at Kislovodsk; first performance May 29, 1924, Paris)
 31 *Contes de la vieille grand'mère* for piano (1918)
 32 *Four pieces* for piano: *Danza—Menuetto—Gavotta—Valse* (1918)

- 33 *Love for Three Oranges*—opera (orchestrated between June 17, 1919, and Oct. 1, 1919, in New York)
- 34 *Overture on Hebrew Themes* for clarinet, piano and string quartet; also orchestra version (1919; orchestra version completed May 31, 1934, in Bugry, near Moscow)
- 35 *Five melodies without words*, for song and piano or violin and piano (score for voice and piano completed Dec. 28, 1920, in Los Angeles)
- 36 Five songs to words by Balmont: *Une incantation du feu et de l'eau*—*La voix des oiseaux*—*Le papillon*—*Pense à moi*—*Les granits* (1921)
- 37 *The Flaming Angel*—opera (first version: piano sketches begun Jan. 20, 1920, New York; completed Jan. 13, 1923, Ettal, Germany)
- 38 *Fifth Sonata* for piano (1923)
- 39 *Quintette* for wind and strings (1924)
- 40 *Second Symphony* for orchestra (1924; first performance June 6, 1925, Paris)
- 41 *Le pas d'acier*—ballet (1925; first performance June 7, 1927, Paris)
- 42 *Overture* for orchestra (17 instruments), (orchestral score completed Aug. 24, 1926, Samoreau, France)
- 43 *Divertimento* for orchestra (orchestral score completed Oct. 3, 1929 at Culor, France; first performance Dec. 22, 1929, Paris)
- 43 bis *Divertimento*, 4 pieces for piano (completed June 23, 1938, Moscow)
- 44 *Third Symphony* for orchestra (1928)
- 45 *Choses en soi* for piano (1928)
- 46 *L'enfant prodigue*—ballet (1928-29; first performance Paris, May 20, 1929)
- 47 *Fourth Symphony* for orchestra (1929-30; completed June 23, 1930; first performance Nov. 14, 1930, Boston)
- 5/48 *Sinfonietta* for orchestra (1909-29)
- 49 Four portraits from the opera *The Gambler* (1931)
- 50 *Quartet* for strings (1930)
- 51 *Sur le Borysthène*—ballet (1930; first performance Dec. 12, 1932, Paris)
- 52 Six pieces for piano: *Intermezzo*—*Rondo*—*Etude*—*Scherzino*—*Andante*—*Scherzo* (1931)
- 53 *Fourth Concerto* for the left hand, piano (1931)
- 54 *Two Sonatinas* for piano (1931)
- 55 *Fifth Concerto* for piano, in G major (1932; first performance Oct. 31, 1932, Berlin)
- 56 *Sonata* for two violins (1932)
- 57 *Symphonic Song* for orchestra (1933; first performance Apr. 14, 1934, Moscow)
- 58 *Concerto* for violoncello (first version: sketched in 1934, Paris; Orchestral score of second version completed Sept. 18, 1938, in Nicolina Gora, near Moscow; first performance Nov. 26, 1938, Moscow)
- 59 Three pieces for piano: *Promenade*—*Paysage*—*Sonatine pastorale* (1934)
- 60 *Lieutenant Kije*, symphonic suite for orchestra (orchestration completed July 8, 1934, Moscow)
- 61 *Nuits d'Egypte*, symphonic suite for orchestra (1934)
- 62 *Pensées*, three pieces for piano (1933-34)
- 63 *Second Concerto* for violin and orchestra, in G minor (Sketches begun in spring of 1935, in Paris; orchestral score completed Aug. 16, 1935, in Baku, Caucasus; first performed Dec. 1, 1935, Madrid)
- 64 *Romeo and Juliet*—ballet (Sketches completed Sept. 8, 1935; orchestral score completed summer of 1938, in Moscow; first performance Nov. 24, 1936, Moscow)
- 65 *Musiques d'enfants* for piano (1935)

- 66 *Mass Songs* for chorus (1936)
 - 67 *Peter and the Wolf* for orchestra (Piano sketches completed Apr. 15, 1936, Moscow; orchestral score completed Apr. 24, 1936, Moscow; first performance May 2, 1936, Moscow)
 - 68 *La bavarde et Chanson sucrée*, for voice and piano (1936)
 - 69 *Marches* for military orchestra (1935)
 - 70 *La dame de pique*, film, for orchestra (1936)
 - 71 *Eugène Onéguine*, drama, for orchestra (1936)
 - 72 *Russian Overture* for orchestra (1936; first performance Oct. 29, 1936, Moscow)
 - 73 *Mélodies de Pouchkine* for voice and piano (1936)
 - 74 *Cantata* for the 20th Anniversary of the October Revolution, to the words of Lenin, Stalin, and Marx (Orchestral score completed Aug. 16, 1937, Nicolina Gora, near Moscow)
 - 75 Boris Godunov, incidental music
 - 76 Ten pieces for piano—*Romeo and Juliet* (1937)
 - 77 *Chants de nos jours*, for chorus and orchestra (1937; first performance Jan. 5, 1938)
 - 78 *Alexander Nevsky*, cantata, for solo, chorus, and orchestra, in 7 parts (Orchestral score completed Feb. 7, 1939, Moscow)
- (This list has been compiled by Prokofiev for the author of this article)

THE OLD TUTTAH

A Kabardinian Tale

[Just as folk-tales sung by the old bards related both to the legendary exploits of national heroes and to the contemporary scene, so today in the Soviet Union, many of these singers continue to comment on current developments and to sing of the new national heroes, while still using the traditional forms and the references to legend. Robert Magidoff has collected a number of these contemporary folk-tales of many nationalities from which the following short tale is taken. THE OLD TUTTAH is essentially a PRAVDA editorial rendered in a Kabardinian folk-tale—or, as the Soviets describe the style, a tale, socialist in content and national in form.]

Tuttah was very old. The tower of his years reached the very skies, and clouds of time covered its grey top. Tuttah began to forget his age. He climbed the tower of old age and it took all his strength to get there. And a day came when the old man knew he would soon have to go down the cave of death.

Tuttah lived with his two sons. One of them was the chairman of the *kolkhoz*; the other worked for the Party. At supper Tuttah learned about all that had taken place in the *kolkhoz* during the day. So many things! They grew like trees. The first son planted those trees, the other son, the Party-man, would clip them if they didn't grow right. Yes, many things were taking place in the *kolkhoz*, and Tuttah knew all about them.

One morning death reminded Tuttah of itself. It was the first time death did that. Three times does death remind us, old men, of itself, and the fourth time it takes us along to its cave. Tuttah knew the ways of death and on that morning his native village saw him take to the road.

The old Elbrus would have laughed at Tuttah had he known what drove him away from his home. Tuttah went to take a look at his native land for the last time, for he was as wise as a sage who reached the very top of the mountain of life. And he saw the things that were good and he also saw the things that were bad. And the old Tuttah directed his steps to Nalchik, the capital of his land. He reached a stone house

and came up to the second floor to Betal, the son of Edeek Kalmikov.

"Where is Betal?" enquired Tuttah. "I must see him. Tell Betal that Tuttah asks for him, old Tuttah who came from a small village on big business."

"Come in, Tuttah, come!" cried Kalmikov from behind the door. "I am always glad to see a good man. What is bothering you, Tuttah? Don't you sleep well in your new house? Don't they feed you well? Or perhaps someone dared insult you?"

"Valagi!" said Tuttah. "Who in entire Kabardinia would insult an honest man? Unless it is someone who wants you to be his enemy. But who wishes to earn the hatred of entire Kabardinia? He who does that is insane."

"Well, if there is nothing you want of me, let us have some tea and discuss things that are good."

"Don't mix up my thoughts, Betal," said Tuttah. "I want to speak to you of things that are bad."

"I am glad to hear of things that are good," answered Betal, "but I am also glad to hear of bad things."

"You speak in riddles, Betal. My old head does not understand them."

"There are no riddles in my words. The bad things will be changed into good things, bringing us joy. If this is your errand, speak of things that are bad, speak boldly."

The great telephone on Betal's table rang and thundered.

"Silence!" shouted Betal.

All of Kabardinia must have heard his voice. For it was Stalin himself calling from the distant Moscow.

"Comrade Stalin!" said Betal. "Another province challenges us to socialist competition."

"You have as many good workers as there are stars in the skies," said Stalin.

"The government rewards you with the Order of Lenin."

"Thank you for the order," said Betal, "I am going to give it to all the members of our collective farms."

"Tell Stalin," said Tuttah, who would not keep silent even then, "tell Stalin that the old men of Kabardinia will carry the Order in their hearts."

Betal repeated his words to Stalin.

"Thank the wise old men of Kabardinia," said Stalin.

But what a restless person that Tuttah was. He started again to speak of things that were bad. He spread in front of him a large sheet of paper, and just as if he were writing, he searched all the corners of his memory.

Betal grew sad and sullen. He forgot his tea and food, put on his sheepskin coat, got into his machine-wind and rushed to the villages.

"Betal, why hurry now? You can take care of it tomorrow. Have your tea, eat, get your night's rest!"

But Betal had already disappeared on the mountain road.

Tuttah remained in his place, and at the bottom of his heart he pitied those who were at the head of the villages Betal was now to visit.

"No, I am not going to drink tea with you," Betal will say to them. "This tea will be bitter."

Thus sat Tuttah in Betal's room, thinking and looking at the precious stones that were placed under glass near the wall. Suddenly the black telephone rang and thundered again on Betal's table.

The old Tuttah took off his cap, stood up and placed the black receiver to his ear.

"I hear you, Stalin," said he.

"How can you tell this is Stalin speaking?" spoke the voice which makes old hearts beat with youth and vigor, and wraps in warm furs frozen human hearts.

"I know it is you, for who else spends sleepless nights in cold Moscow, who else guards over all, and guides the traveler along his way, and knows the night before whether the sun will rise?"

"Old Tuttah, you have never been known as a flatterer, and I therefore thank you for your good words. I am not the only

one who is worried about the way things are run. Your sons and you, too, are guarding your land. But you haven't told Betal of all the things that are wrong. You still have many scrofulous children. Disease and filth still harrass many men and women. There are still very few magnificent horses in Kabardinia, and your soil keeps from you many secrets of its abundance. The youth still has to be brought up."

"You are right and wise, oh, great Stalin," said Tuttah.

"Then do not remain in Betal's room. Go into the fields, to the villages, and speak to your people, let them know all your thoughts. Don't let the men in charge sleep under their warm blankets, don't let them ride along on magnificent horses. There is a great deal of work to do yet. We have to do it quickly so that you can see from the tower of years how the world is becoming so beautiful that men won't have to die any more."

And Tuttah left for the villages.

I, who am telling this tale, and you who are listening to me, cannot keep up with Betal's machine-wind. I do not know what he did in the villages. But upon his return, as soon as he climbed out of his automobile, he said:

"Find immediately that old man Tuttah. I want to tell him that all that was wrong is changed now. I want once more to drink tea with the old wise man."

Everyone went in search of Tuttah, but death who knows no master, had already called him.

Then Kalmikov stepped again into his machine-wind, and left for the cemetery, where Tuttah lay.

"You are in your grave, Tuttah," said Betal, "and I am standing before you. You are in your grave, Tuttah and your face is covered with earth, but let your face smile to me from your grave, for I have done as you told me. Rest in peace, dear Tuttah."

Betal ordered Tuttah's body taken from its grave, and buried in the orchard. When our apples, pears, plums and apricots ripened, they would fall from the branches on Tuttah's grave, and he could eat them if he wanted to.

DOCUMENTS

Reports Regarding Fisheries Negotiations

TASS DESPATCH, December 8, 1938

Several Japanese newspapers and agencies, reporting during the last few days on the course of Soviet-Japanese conversations regarding the fisheries convention, attempted to distort the position of the Soviet Government in this matter. In view of this, TASS officially publishes the statement made on November 28th by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov to the Japanese Ambassador Togo.

You, Mr. Ambassador, said Mr. Litvinov, in regard to the fisheries convention generally refer to the Portsmouth Treaty. You apparently overlook the following points:

1. According to Article II of the Portsmouth Treaty, the Government of the former Russian Empire assumed the obligation "to arrange with Japan, for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishing along the coasts of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas." It is entirely obvious from this that there is no obligation in regard to the number of fishing lots to be given to the Japanese citizens or in regard to the conditions of renting these lots, and that both of these subjects can be the subject of voluntary agreement between the two countries. After signing such an agreement, each side must undertake the necessary measures for fulfilling its obligations to the other party and also for the general relationships between them.

2. In the course of the negotiations in recent years, every time the Japanese Ambassador referred to the Portsmouth Treaty, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs pointed out to him the violation of the Portsmouth Treaty by the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria where Japan was obligated not to have any troops other than railroad guards up to fifteen men per kilometre. It was pointed out also that there were obstacles imposed by Japan to the free navigation of Soviet ships in the Straits of La Perouse because of a military zone there, although, in Article IX of the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan was obligated not to establish any fortifications or military armaments on Sakhalin and the islands nearby it.

3. In addition to this, it is necessary to mention new violations by the Japanese Government of obligations assumed by it comparatively recently. I have in mind the obligation of the Japanese Government in connection with the sale of the C.E.R. contained in the note of the Japanese Government of March 23, 1935, reading as follows:

"In case any difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of payments on the part of the Government of Manchoukuo, the Japanese Government will make every effort necessary under given

circumstances in order that the Government of the USSR may receive all payments due to them from the Government of Manchoukuo wholly, and within respective time limits prescribed by the said agreement, so that the Government of the USSR may suffer absolutely no loss in connection with the said difficulties."

Difficulties have arisen in connection with the fact that the Government of Manchoukuo has not made its final payment for the C.E.R. amounting to 5,981,625 yen and despite numerous reminders, the Japanese Government has not fulfilled its guarantees, although the time for the payment has long since past.

It is impossible to consider as acceptable the situation that the Japanese Government, having violated its own obligations to the USSR, insists not only on the latter's fulfillment of its obligation, but also on the satisfaction of Japan's demand over and above these obligations.

In view of the above, Litvinov added, the Soviet Government does not find it possible to enter into negotiations regarding the conclusion of a long-term fisheries agreement until the Japanese Government has fulfilled at least its obligations in regard to the payments on the C.E.R. However, in case the time remaining until the end of this year, that is, until the expiration of the present temporary fisheries agreement, is not sufficient for making these payments and for completing negotiations on a new fisheries convention, the Soviet Government, as a token of its good will, will be prepared to conclude a temporary fisheries agreement for one year on the following basis:

The lots now exploited by the Japanese fishery interests will again be granted to them until the expiration of the leases. As regards those lots exploited by the Japanese fisheries whose leases have already expired, these will be put up for auction in February, 1939, except for a certain number of lots in the districts of the Primore, Okhotsk, Nagaev, Icha, and Bolsheretsk, which for reasons of the conservation of the fisheries or for strategic reasons, it has been considered essential completely to exclude henceforth from Japanese exploitation. The number of lots thus excluded will not exceed 40, while the total number exploited by the Japanese is 380 lots. At the same time, it will be possible to extend for one year the concession contracts on the canning factories in the corresponding fishery lots.

On the above mentioned detailed and concrete proposal of the Soviet Government, Japan has as yet given no answer.

TASS DESPATCH, December 10, 1938

TASS has been informed from authoritative sources that on the 8th of this month, the Japanese Ambassador, Togo, gave the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov the answer of the Japanese Government to his statement of November 28th.

1. The Japanese Government considers that in view of the important events such as its "declaration of independence," Manchuria has become something entirely different than it was at the time of the con-

clusion of the Portsmouth Treaty and that Japan has the right to maintain troops there on the basis of an agreement with Manchuria.

Litvinov stated that the events which the Ambassador called the "declaration of independence of Manchoukuo" took place as the result of sending into Manchuria and maintaining there a considerable number of Japanese troops as was foreseen and forbidden in the Portsmouth Treaty. The statement of the Japanese Government regarding the nature of the present regime in Manchuria is not shared, not only by the Soviet Union but by the League of Nations in which 60 nations still have membership, and also by the United States of America. Even if it is recognized that there has been established in Manchuria such a new situation that not all the articles of the Portsmouth Treaty should be considered binding, nevertheless, the Soviet Government cannot recognize the right of Japan to decide unilaterally that only those Articles which are not convenient for it are no longer binding and that all the other Articles which are convenient for it remain in force. Considering the complete difference of opinion between Japan and the Soviet Union on this question, Litvinov proposed that further discussion on this matter be dropped inasmuch as it is not of decisive importance in the question of the fisheries. The Ambassador agreed with this.

2. Ambassador Togo said that the closed zone in the Straits of La Perouse should not be an obstacle to the free navigation of Soviet ships. To this, Litvinov replied that in the absence of the right to construct fortifications on the coast of the Straits there should be no closed zone there, but that, in any case, he took note of the assurance of the Japanese Government that in the future there would be no obstacle to the free navigation of Soviet ships in the Straits.

3. The Japanese Ambassador again insisted that there is no connection between the payments for the C.E.R. and the fisheries negotiations. It is necessary to decide all of these disputed questions separately, gradually and in order. However, he said, the Japanese Government will be willing to consider favorably the question of the payments, if a fishery convention is signed immediately—that is, before December 10—for 8 years, with those amendments which Japan has ratified but which have not up to this time been approved by the Soviet Government. Such immediate signing of the Convention is necessary, according to the Ambassador, in view of the necessity for going through certain legislative formalities in Japan. To no other fishery agreement, either long term or of temporary character, will Japan agree.

Litvinov answered that the guarantee for the payment on the C.E.R. could not be connected with or conditional upon any particular amendment of the fisheries convention and the guarantee must be fulfilled without any conditions, and in full. In this sense, there certainly is no connection between the two questions. The connection consists only in the fact that, not having fulfilled its own obligations, the Japanese Government should not so persistently refer to the obligations of the

Soviet Union, especially since the Soviet Union has not violated its obligations. If it is necessary to decide the disputed questions in order, then it is necessary to begin with the payments on the C.E.R. which are already 9 months overdue. The existing temporary fishery agreement remains in force until December 31. The Japanese are able to catch fish until the end of the season and the Soviet Government does not intend to deprive them of this right in the future. The new fishing season does not begin for several months. In this way, even from a chronological point of view, the question of the payment on the C.E.R. should have priority. The phrase used by the Japanese Ambassador "will consider favorably" is not concrete. There must be an actual transfer of the payments to the Bank or an exact date named for the proposed payment. If this takes place before the 10th of December then the Soviet Government will be ready to acquaint the Japanese immediately with the terms on which it is prepared to conclude a long-term fisheries convention, and it will then depend entirely on the Japanese Government whether the matter is completed before the 10th. Litvinov again made reference to his statement of November 28th when the decision of the Soviet Government was made perfectly clear regarding those conditions on which it would agree to negotiate a fisheries convention and on the basis of which it would be possible to conclude a temporary fisheries agreement.

The Japanese Ambassador promised to report the content of this conversation to his Government.

TASS DESPATCH, December 15, 1938

On the 11th and the 13th of this month, the fisheries negotiations were continued between the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador Togo.

The Japanese Ambassador again asked whether or not the Soviet Government would not agree, in the event of favorable consideration by the Japanese Government of the question of the overdue payments on the C.E.R., to sign in unchanged form the project of the fisheries convention which the Soviet Government refused to ratify in 1936 and 1937. Having received a negative answer from the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador stated that in that case he was ready to begin negotiations for a temporary agreement for one year in accordance with the proposal of the Soviet Government of November 28th. Litvinov agreed stating that this did not, however, remove the Soviet Government's demands regarding the payments on the C.E.R. to which question it would be necessary to return in the further course of the negotiations.

Togo objected to the basis of the temporary agreement which was put forth in the statement of Litvinov on November 28th and insisted on the extension of the temporary agreement now in force, corresponding with the above mentioned project for a fishery convention which had been rejected by the Soviet Government. In the opinion of the Japanese Ambassador, in the event that it proves impossible to con-

clude a new convention, the convention formerly in force should be renewed. The changes proposed by the Soviet Government are in conflict with this convention and the documents attached to it, and also with the Portsmouth Treaty, in which were mentioned the Seas in which the Japanese received the right to fish. It is impossible to put the lots up at auction which were now leased to the Japanese fisheries. In general it was impossible to change the practice which has existed for thirty years. The auctions are even in contradiction to the new Soviet constitution. The auctions would cause conflicts and would even exacerbate Soviet-Japanese relations, a fact which is particularly disturbing to the Japanese Government.

Litvinov, for his part, made the following statement: The Ambassador based his demands primarily on the agreement of 1932 which expired in 1936. For this reason this agreement has placed no further obligations on the Soviet Government. Moreover the convention of 1928, to which the Japanese Ambassador referred, was denounced by the Japanese Government for the purpose obviously of reconsidering it, i.e., introducing changes into it. These changes it actually proposed in 1932, before the expiration of the convention, at which time the practice of auctions was curtailed which had earlier been followed under the terms of that same convention. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of a practice unchanged for 30 years; on the contrary, this practice had been changed during this period. If Japan could propose changes, then why is it not right for the USSR to do so? As a matter of fact, we are proposing now to return to the old practice in accord with the 1928 convention which provided for the lease of lots to the Japanese at auction. The proposed changes in no way conflict with any obligation of the USSR for, as a result of the expiration of the fishery convention of 1928 and the expiration of the temporary agreement for one year which expires on December 31st of this year, the Soviet Government is freed from these obligations; but even if one turns to the Portsmouth Treaty, there reference is made only to the general principle of granting to the Japanese fishery interests the right to catch fish in certain Seas. This right no one is planning to take away from the Japanese. Not one of the Seas mentioned in the Portsmouth Treaty is to be excluded; but it does not follow from this, however, that all the lots in these Seas must be granted to the Japanese. The anxiety about the inviolability of the Soviet constitution can safely be left to the Soviet Government. No conflicts are expected as a result of the auctions, since the proposed changes in essence amount to the exclusion from Japanese exploitation of 40 lots, that is, about 10 per cent of the total number of lots. The exclusion of these lots is made necessary primarily for strategic reasons to which the Soviet Government at this time must give special attention. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs said publicly just recently that the Japanese Government is preparing war against the USSR. If such statements and the conclusion by the Japanese Government of the anti-Soviet treaty do not, in the opinion of the Japanese Government,

cause a worsening of relations, it is even less possible to allude to this in connection with the 10 per cent reduction in the number of Japanese fishery lots.

In conclusion, Litvinov proposed to the Ambassador that he again report to his Government that the temporary agreement can be concluded only on the basis of the decisions taken by the Soviet Government, which were reported to the Ambassador on November 28th.

In the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador was given detailed information on the lots which it is proposed to exclude.

TASS DESPATCH, December 24, 1938

The Japanese Ambassador Togo had a further conversation with People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov on the fisheries on the 15th, 17th, 20th and 23rd of this month. Inasmuch as in the first three conversations the Japanese Ambassador made no concrete proposals but repeated the earlier arguments in favor of the original position of the Japanese Government, the negotiations did not progress. On the 23rd, Togo, in the name of his Government, agreed to the exclusion of 12 of the lots now exploited by the Japanese but demanded, however, their replacement by others in the same regions. At the same time, he continued to protest against the proposal for auctions. Litvinov rejected this proposal and on his part proposed as a final concession to put up for auction 3 lots in the Japanese Sea of the 40 lots which were proposed to be excluded and, in addition, to put up for auction 7 new lots. In case the Japanese obtain through the auctions these 10 lots this would mean there would actually only be 30 lots which the Japanese were excluded from exploiting. The principle of auctions must be retained as a necessary condition.

The Japanese Ambassador rejected these proposals.

TASS DESPATCH, January 28, 1939

Regarding the fisheries negotiations, TASS can report that in the last few weeks there has been an exchange of notes and memoranda between the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador Togo. The immediate occasion for this exchange of notes was the announcement of the Far Eastern Fisheries auctions for March 15.

In his notes and memoranda the Japanese ambassador, recognizing the approach of the preparatory period for the fishing season, found it, however, not correct to announce auctions at the time when negotiations were still being carried on between the two governments. In general he considers that the Soviet Government does not have the right unilaterally to announce auctions and that the auctions would be an infringement of the fisheries rights of the Japanese, making these rights of no value. The Ambassador continued to protest against the Soviet Government's intended exclusion of a certain number of lots from Japanese exploitation. In the opinion of the Japanese Ambassa-

dor, any change in the existing situation and violation of "the stabilization" "would be a blow to certain historic feelings of the Japanese people." The exclusion of lots, as it were, is illegal and is in contradiction to the spirit of the Portsmouth Treaty. By excluding lots for strategic reasons, the Soviet Government is making a political question of an economic one, especially since the strategic considerations are not based on an agreement. The Japanese Government, however, is ready to accept the exclusion of these lots, if an equal number of equally valuable new lots is granted, and thereby "stabilization" will be retained. Repeating the arguments which he had developed several times during the earlier conversations, the Japanese Ambassador again referred to possible conflicts and consequences which should be weighed by the Soviet Government.

In notes and memoranda sent in reply by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the fallacies of the arguments of the Japanese Ambassador were pointed out, as well as the lack of foundation for the Japanese claims. The following was stressed:

The Japanese fisheries interests have always shown special interest in having the auctions announced well in advance of the season, so as to give them time to prepare for the fishing season. The continuation of the negotiations in no way limits the freedom of action of the Soviet Government, in view of the fact that it has categorically stated that the basis for the new agreement can only be the lease of the lots at auction. The announcement of auctions of fishery lots on the Soviet coast and in Soviet territorial waters which are the property of the USSR cannot be other than a unilateral act of the Soviet Government and relates to the sovereign rights of the Soviet Government. It is impossible to refer, as the Ambassador does, to conventions and agreements which have expired, and if the Portsmouth Treaty is alluded to, despite the fact that the letter and the spirit of the treaty have indisputably been fundamentally violated by Japan, there is nothing contained in it conflicting with the auctions. Nor does the treaty give Japan the right to claim any particular Soviet lots or any particular number. During the period since the Portsmouth Treaty has been in force there have been years when the Japanese have had just a few more than 100 fishing lots while at the present time they have the opportunity to rent at the auctions more than 300 lots. And from this it does not follow that once a lot has been rented to the Japanese fishing interests, it must remain with them forever and can be taken back from them only in exchange for another lot. The reference of the Ambassador to the legality or illegality of the actions of the Soviet Government is an arbitrary statement, having no basis or justification in any obligations of the Soviet Union. The Japanese must understand the fact that this is a question of lots which are the property of the Soviet Government and which the Japanese can use only by agreement with the latter and only as lessees. No obligations arise for the Soviet Government out of the situation existing in recent years or out of

the practice established by agreement between the two parties, and the continuation or the change of this practice depends on its good will. Likewise there arises no obligation for it out of the so-called "historic feelings of the Japanese people," if it is possible at all to speak of a serious blow to these feelings because of a slight curtailment of the number of Japanese lots. The Soviet Government is certainly not trying to convert the fisheries question into a political problem but this does not mean that "it should ignore the policy of the Japanese Government in relation to the USSR and the public statements of its official representatives regarding its aims and not take the necessary measures for the protection of its coast and the borders of its country. Attention to matters of defense naturally is not based on any conventions or agreements with other governments and is a natural, undisputed and inalienable right of the Soviet Government." (Memorandum of Narkomindel, Jan. 10th) The Soviet government considers it inadmissible to press demands on it which do not arise out of its formal obligations. "The policy of the Japanese Government in relation to the USSR does not give it either moral or political grounds for demanding from the Soviet Government anything beyond its formal obligations." (Memorandum Narkomindel, Jan. 21) In granting the Japanese the opportunity to rent lots at the auctions the obligations under the Portsmouth Treaty are also completely fulfilled. "The participation of the Japanese fishery enterprises in the auctions, which have been announced, can satisfy their interests more than adequately. Injury to their interests will be caused by their refusal to take part in the auctions, with all the consequences arising from this." (Memorandum of Jan. 21) "As to the concealed threats which the Japanese Ambassador has resorted to and which the Japanese press has used more openly, they are unworthy and in any case they will not be of any advantage to the Japanese fishery interests and will have no influence on the completely just position of the Soviet Government." (Memorandum of Narkomindel, Jan. 21)

TASS DESPATCH, April 3, 1939

On April 2nd, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Togo signed an agreement on the Fisheries, valid until the end of 1939. For technical reasons the auction of the fishing lots in Vladivostok which was fixed for April 3rd was postponed until April 4th.

The fishing rights of the Japanese in Soviet waters, received by virtue of the Portsmouth Treaty, have hitherto been regulated by the Fisheries Convention of 1928 and by the supplementary agreement of 1932. According to the Convention, the Japanese received their fishing lots by auction. According to the supplementary agreement only new fishing lots were put up for auction while the old ones previously exploited by the Japanese were automatically leased to them only on the strength of lease contracts. The term of the Convention and also of the supplementary agreement expired December 1936, besides which the Con-

vention was denounced by the Japanese Government which evidently expected to obtain more extensive rights for the Japanese fishery owners in concluding a new convention. In view of the sharply marked anti-Soviet course of Japanese policy which found its most vivid expression in the Alliance with Germany under cover of the Anti-Comintern Pact, negotiations on the conclusion of a new long-term fisheries convention which commenced in 1936 yielded no result, and consequently the Convention of 1928 together with the supplementary agreement were prolonged for one year, i.e., for 1937 and later for one more year, i.e., for 1938.

In November, 1938, the Japanese proposed negotiations for the conclusion of a new convention to which the Soviet Government replied that it would agree to undertake such negotiations only after the Japanese Government fulfilled its undertaking concerning the guaranteeing of Manchoukuo's payments for the C.E.R. (Manchoukuo has not yet paid the last installment.) Since the Japanese Government refused to comply with this condition, the Soviet Government agreed to start negotiations only about a provisional fisheries agreement for one year. The negotiations have been carried on for nearly four months. In addition, an exchange of notes and memoranda took place between the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. From the very beginning the Soviet Government announced its decision to return to the system of auctions, both with regard to new fishing lots and to those previously exploited by the Japanese. As to other conditions, it was prepared to conclude a provisional agreement on the basis of the 1928 Convention, with the exception of Clause 8 which provided that lots once opened for exploitation could not be closed but should be auctioned or put at the disposal of the leaseholders without auction.

In this connection, the Soviet Government announced its decision to withdraw from Japanese exploitation, for strategic reasons, 40 lots, including four attached to canneries and one lot for which the lease expires in 1941. Later the Soviet Government found it possible to withdraw, for the above considerations, only 37 lots instead of 40. Besides, the Soviet Government objected to the provisions of the Convention allowing Japan to interfere in the regulation of the amount of catch allotted to the Soviet State fishing industry. The Convention restricted this amount to 2,000,000 poods. The Japanese persistently objected to the auction system, demanding the automatic prolongation of the lease contracts for all lots which were formerly exploited by the Japanese and the lease contracts which have expired. The Japanese objected with particular insistence to the withdrawal of 37 lots and expounded an absolutely groundless theory, alleging that all the lots previously obtained by the Japanese are "stable" and must forever remain in Japanese exploitation. The Japanese also insisted that, in the event the auction system were adopted, all the lots exploited by the Soviet State industry should be put up for auction.

Subsequently, the Japanese agreed, at first, to withdrawal of 12 lots and then 24, provided that they received instead an equal number of lots, and they insisted that the new lots be equal in value and be selected by the Japanese themselves. The Soviet Government resolutely rejected the principle of substitution or compensation for the lots withdrawn from the Japanese for one consideration or another. Japan based her demands in the above disputed question on the Portsmouth Treaty, which, however, as it was pointed out to her, contains no mention of the procedure for leasing lots to the Japanese or of the number of lots to which the Japanese have a right, or of the so-called "stabilization" of Japanese lots, or of the limitation of Soviet State industry. Besides it was pointed out that the Portsmouth Treaty had already been violated in many parts by the Japanese Government itself. In view of the weakness of her formal position, Japan persistently attempted to refer also to the corresponding articles of the Fisheries Convention and the supplementary agreement, despite the fact that they have expired and therefore no longer impose any obligation on the Soviet Government.

When it became apparent that Japan agreed to accept the system of auction and to renounce the principle of so-called stabilization, the Soviet Government in its turn met her by agreeing to put on auction an additional 9 lots of its choice, which the Japanese would be able to obtain by auction. Agreement was reached on the following basis: first, the Japanese will obtain lots, for which the lease contracts have expired, only through auction. Second, for strategic reasons, 37 lots will be withdrawn from Japanese exploitation, including four lots attached to two canneries, which will be closed. Third, one of these lots, whose lease does not expire until 1941, will be replaced by another lot offered by the Soviet Government for the same term. Fourth, the lease contracts for the lots received by the Japanese at the auction will be concluded in accordance with the 1928 Convention, for a term of five years, to which the Soviet Government has not objected from the very beginning. Fifth, lots to which are attached canneries, constructed by the Japanese, excepting the four lots mentioned above, will be leased for one year without auction, to which the Soviet Government has also not objected. Sixth, departing from the 1928 Convention, the Soviet Government will itself fix the amount of catch for the State industry, estimated for 1939 at 5 million poods. Seventh, nine additional Soviet lots shall be put up for auction. Since, owing to the fact that the Japanese did not participate in the auctions of March 15th, Soviet fishing organizations obtained six of these lots as well as four lots which previously were exploited by the Japanese, these organizations agreed to concede to the Japanese all of these lots. Eighth, in view of the apprehension expressed by the Japanese Ambassador that the rent might be raised inordinately by the auction, *Dalryba* (Chief administration of the Fishing Industry of the Far East) advised that it does not intend to raise the rent more than 10 per cent. Since the most acute and most disputable questions raised during the negotia-

tions concerned the return to the system of auction, the withdrawal from Japanese exploitation of 37 lots, and the refutation of the false theories of the "stability" of Japanese lots, and the special position of the Soviet State Fishing Industry of the Far East, the agreement now concluded gives full satisfaction to Soviet Governmental and public circles.

RULES OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (bolsheviks)

Section of the Communist International

[Adopted Unanimously by the XVIII Congress of the VKP(b)]

The All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), being a section of the Communist International, is the organized vanguard of the working class of the USSR, the highest form of its class organization. The Party is guided in its work by Marxist-Leninist theory.

The Party effects the leadership of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia — all the Soviet people, in the struggle for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the working class, for the strengthening and development of the socialist order, for the victory of communism.

The Party is the nucleus of leadership of all organizations of toilers, both social and governmental, and ensures the successful construction of communist society.

The Party is a unified militant organization, held together by conscious discipline, equally obligatory for all members of the Party. The Party is strong because of its coherence, unity of will and unity of action which are incompatible with any deviation from its program and rules, with any violation of Party discipline, with factional groupings, or with duplicity. The Party cleanses its ranks of persons violating the program of the Party, the rules of the Party, or the discipline of the Party.

The Party demands from its members active and self-sacrificing work to carry out the program and rules of the Party, to fulfill all decisions of the Party and its bodies, to ensure unity within the Party and the consolidation of the fraternal international relations among the toilers of the nationalities of the USSR, as well as among the proletarians of the whole world.

I. *Party Members, their Obligations and Rights*

1. A Party member is anyone who accepts the program of the Party, who works in one of its organizations, submits to its decisions and pays membership dues.

2. It is the duty of a Party Member:

(a) To work untiringly to raise his consciousness, to master the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

(b) To observe strict Party discipline, to take an active part in the political life of the Party and of the country, and to carry out in practice the policy of the Party and the decisions of the Party bodies.

(c) To set an example in the observance of labor and state discipline, to master the technique of his work and continually to raise his production and work qualifications.

(d) Daily to strengthen connections with the masses, to respond quickly to the questions and the needs of the toilers, to explain to the non-Party masses the meaning of the policy and the decisions of the Party.

3. A Party member has the right:

(a) To participate in free and business-like discussion of practical questions of Party policy in Party meetings or in the Party press;

(b) To criticize any Party worker at Party meetings;

(c) To elect and be elected to Party bodies;

(d) To demand personal participation in all cases when decisions regarding his activity or behavior are being taken;

(e) To refer any question or statement to any Party instance, including the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) [VKP(b)].

4. Members are admitted to the Party only individually. New members are admitted from among the candidates who have gone through the specified period of candidateship [probation]. Workers, peasants and intellectuals who are conscious, active and devoted to the cause of communism may be admitted to Party membership.

Persons who have reached the age of 18 may be admitted to the Party.

The procedure in admitting Party members from among the candidates is as follows:

(a) To be admitted to Party membership, persons must submit recommendations from three Party members of not less than three-years' Party standing who have known them for not less than one year at their place of work.

Note 1. When members of the Komsomol are admitted to the Party, the recommendation of the District Committee of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth] is equivalent to the recommendation of one Party member.

Note 2. Members and alternates [candidates] of the Central Committee VKP(b) may not give recommendations.

(b) The question of admission to the Party is considered and decided by a general meeting of the primary Party organization, whose decision takes effect when ratified by the District Committee, or in cities where there are no regional divisions, by the City Committee of the Party.

The presence of those giving recommendations is not obligatory at the discussion of the question of admission to the Party.

(c) Young persons up to and including the age of twenty may join the Party only through the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth.

(d) Former members of other parties are admitted in exceptional cases and on the recommendation of five Party members; three of whom must be of ten-years' Party standing and two of pre-revolutionary Party standing, and only through a primary Party organization: the admission of such a candidate must be ratified by the Central Committee VKP(b).

5. Persons recommending applicants for admission are responsible for the good quality of their recommendation.

6. The Party standing of applicants admitted from candidateship to Party membership is calculated from the date of the general meeting of the primary Party organization at which the motion confirming the comrade in question as a Party member was passed.

7. Every member of any Party organization who removes to a locality covered by another Party organization is registered as a member of the latter.

Note: The transfer of Party members from one organization to another is effected in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Central Committee VKP(b).

8. Party members and candidates who have failed to pay their membership dues for three months without sufficient cause are regarded as having dropped out of the Party and decision to this effect is taken by the primary Party organization, and ratified by the District or City Committee of the Party.

9. The question of the expulsion of any member from the Party is decided at a general meeting of the primary Party organization to which the member to be expelled belongs, and is ratified by the District Committee or City Committee of the Party. The decision of the District or City Committee to expel a member from the Party takes effect only if it is ratified by the Oblast Committee, Krai Committee of the Party or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a Union Republic.

10. Until the decision for expulsion from the Party is ratified by the Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, the Party book remains in the hands of the Party member and he has the right to attend closed Party meetings.

The Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic publishes notice of the expulsions of Party Members in the local Party press, with a statement of the reasons for the expulsions, and it also publishes notice of the reinstatement of members, unjustly expelled.

11. In the decision of the question of expelling from the Party or reinstatement of rights of a Party member to one previously expelled, the maximum care must be ensured and comradely attention and minute examination of the charges made against the Party member.

In cases of minor infractions (non-attendance at meetings, non-payment of membership dues in the established period, etc.) measures of Party education and influence, provided in the rules, should be applied and not expulsion from the Party, which is the highest measure of Party punishment.

12. Appeals from persons expelled from the Party must be considered by the suitable Party bodies not later than two weeks from the day when they are filed.

II. *Candidates for Party Membership*

13. All persons desirous of joining the Party must pass through a period of candidateship, necessary to familiarize the candidate with the program, the rules and the tactics of the Party and to give the Party organization the opportunity to test the personal qualities of the candidate.

14. The method of admission of candidates (individual admission, presentation of recommendations and their verification, decision by the primary organization on admission, and its ratification) is identical with that applying to the admission to Party membership.

15. The period of candidateship is fixed at one year.

16. The candidates for the Party take part in the meetings of the organization to which they belong, at which they have a consultative voice.

17. Candidates for the Party pay the usual membership dues into the treasury of the local Party committee.

III. *The Structure of the Party. Inner-Party Democracy*

18. The guiding principle of the organizational structure of the Party is democratic centralism, which signifies:

a. The application of the elective principle to all leading bodies of the Party, from the lowest to the highest;

b. The periodical accountability of the Party bodies to their respective Party organizations;

c. Strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;

d. The absolutely binding character of the decisions of the higher bodies upon the lower bodies.

19. The Party is built according to the territorial-production principle: the Party organization serving a certain area is regarded as superior to all Party organizations serving part of the same area; or a Party organization serving a whole branch of work is regarded as superior to all Party organizations serving part of the same branch of work.

20. All Party organizations are autonomous in deciding local questions in so far as these decisions do not conflict with any decision of the Party.

21. The highest leading body of each organization is the general

meeting (for primary organizations), the Conference (for example, for the district, and oblast organizations), the Congress (for the Communist Party of the Union Republics and for the VKP(b)).

22. The general meeting, conference or congress elects a bureau or committee, which acts as its executive body and guides all the current work of the respective organization.

23. At the elections of Party bodies, voting by slates of nominees is forbidden. The voting must be done by individual nominees, and all members of the Party have the unlimited right to nominate candidates and to criticize the nominees. The elections take place on the basis of secret ballot for the candidates.

24. In all republic, krai and oblast centers, as well as in all more or less large industrial centers, the general membership ["active"] of the city Party organizations are to be called together to discuss the most important decisions of the Party and of the government. The "active" must not be called together for parades or for formal-triumphant approval of these decisions, but for real discussion of them.

In large centers, there should be not only meetings of the city Party "active" but of the district "active."

25. The free and business-like discussion of questions of Party policy in individual organizations or in the Party as a whole is the inalienable right of every Party member, derived from internal Party democracy. Only on the basis of internal Party democracy is it possible to develop Bolshevik self-criticism and to strengthen Party discipline, which must be conscious and not mechanical. But extensive discussion, especially discussion on an All-Union scale, of questions of Party policy must be so organized that it cannot lead to attempts by an insignificant minority to impose its will upon the vast majority of the Party, or to attempts to form factional groupings which break the unity of the Party, to attempts at a split which may shake the strength and endurance of the dictatorship of the working class. Therefore a wide discussion on an All-Union scale can be regarded as necessary only if: (a) this necessity is recognized by at least several local Party organizations whose jurisdiction extends to an oblast or a republic; (b) if there is not a sufficiently solid majority in the Central Committee itself on very important questions of Party policy; (c) if in spite of the existence of a solid majority in the Central Committee which advocates a definite standpoint, the Central Committee still deems it necessary to test the correctness of its policy by means of a discussion in the Party. Only compliance with these conditions can safeguard the Party against an abuse of internal Party democracy by anti-Party elements; only under these conditions can internal Party democracy be counted on to be of profit to the cause and not to be used to the detriment of the Party and the working class.

26. The scheme of Party organization is as follows:

a. For the Party as a whole—the All-Union Congress, the Central Committee VKP(b), the All-Union conference.

(b) For oblast, krai, and Union Republic—oblast, and krai conferences, congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, oblast committees, krai committees, Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics;

(c) For the okrug—okrug conferences, and okrug committees;

(d) For the city and district [*raion*]*—*the city and district conferences, the city and district committees;

(e) For the factory, village, collective farm, machine-tractor station, units of the Red Army and Navy, for offices—general meetings, conferences of the primary Party organizations, bureaus of the primary Party organizations.

27. For the practical work of carrying out Party decisions, there are the following administrations and departments in the Central Committee VKP(b): (a) Administration of Cadres [personnel]; (b) Administration of Propaganda and Agitation; (c) The Organizational-Instructional Department; (d) The Agricultural Department; (e) The Department of Schools: in the okrug, oblast, and krai committees, and in the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics: (a) The Department of Cadres; (b) The Department of Propaganda and Agitation; (c) The Organizational-Instructional Department; (d) The Agricultural Department; (e) The Military Department: in the city and district committees: (a) The Department of Cadres; (b) The Department of Propaganda and Agitation; (c) The Organizational-Instructional Department; (d) The Military Department.

The duties of the Military Departments are to assist the military bodies in keeping account of those liable for military service, in organizing recruiting, in organizing mobilization in case of war, in the organization of anti-aircraft defense, etc.

The leadership of the Departments of Propaganda and Agitation and the Departments of Cadres in the oblast committees, the krai committees and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics must be lodged in special secretaries.

28. Every Party organization, once it is finally confirmed, has the right to have its own seal, but only with the sanction of the corresponding superior Party organization.

IV. *The Higher Bodies of the Party*

29. The supreme body of the VKP(b) is the Congress. Regular sessions are convened not less than once in three years. Special congresses are called by the Central Committee on its own initiative, or at the demand of not less than one-third of the total membership represented at the preceding Party Congress. Notice of the convocation of the Party Congress and of its agenda must be given not later than a month and a half before the Congress. Special congresses must be convened within two months.

The Congress is regarded as valid if the delegates attending repre-

sent not less than half the total membership of the Party represented at the preceding regular congress.

The apportionment of representatives of the Party Congress is laid down by the Central Committee.

30. In case the Central Committee fails to call a special congress within the period stated in paragraph 29, the organizations which demanded it have the right to form an organizational committee enjoying the rights of a Central Committee as regards the convocation of the special congress.

31. The Congress:

(a) Hears and approves the reports of the Central Committee, of the Central Auditing Commission and of other central organizations;

(b) Revises and amends the program and rules of the Party;

(c) Determines the tactical line of the Party on the principal questions of current policy;

(d) Elects a Central Committee, and a Central Auditing Commission.

32. The number of members to be elected to the Central Committee and to the Central Auditing Commission is determined by the Congress. In the event of members dropping out of the Central Committee, their places are taken by alternate members [candidates] elected by the Congress.

33. The Central Committee holds not less than one plenary session every four months. The Central Committee alternates attend the plenary session of the Central Committee, at which they have a consultative voice.

34. The Central Committee organizes a Political Bureau for political work, an Organizational Bureau for the general guidance of the organizational work, a Secretariat for current work of an organizational-executive nature, a Commission of Party Control for verification of the fulfillment of the decisions of the Party and of the Central Committee VKP(b).

35. The Commission of Party Control:

(a) Controls the fulfillment of the decisions of the Party and the Central Committee VKP(b) by the Party organizations and by the soviet-economic organs;

(b) Verifies the work of the local Party organizations;

(c) Brings proceedings against those who have violated the program and rules of the VKP(b), and Party discipline.

36. The Central Committee, during the interval between Congresses, guides the entire work of the Party, represents the Party in its relations with other parties, organizations and institutions, forms various Party institutions and guides their activities, appoints the editorial staffs of the central organs, working under its control, and confirms the appointment of the editorial staffs of the Party organs of large local organizations, organizes and manages enterprises of public im-

portance, distributes the forces and resources of the Party and manages the central funds.

The Central Committee directs the work of the central soviet and public organizations through the Party groups in them.

37. In the interval between Party Congresses the Central Committee calls, not less than once a year, an All-Union Party Conference of representatives of local Party organizations, to discuss questions that arise concerning the policy of the Party.

The delegates to the All-Union Conferences are elected by the plenum of the oblast committees, krai committees and Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

The method for electing the representatives to the All-Union conference and the apportionment of representatives are laid down by the Central Committee VKP(b).

Members of the Central Committee VKP(b) who are not elected as delegates to the Conference from local organizations, take part in the work of the All-Union Conference with the right to consultative voice.

38. The All-Union Conference has the right to replace a part of the members of the Central Committee VKP(b), i.e., the right to remove individual members of the Central Committee VKP(b) who have not fulfilled their duties as members of the Central Committee VKP(b) and replace them with others, but the number so removed cannot exceed one-fifth of the members of the Central Committee VKP(b) elected by the Congress of the Party.

The All-Union Conference replaces the members of the Central Committee VKP(b) from the alternate members, elected by the Congress of the Party, and in their place elects a corresponding number of new alternates [candidates] for the Central Committee VKP(b).

39. The decisions of the All-Union Conference must be ratified by the Central Committee VKP(b), except for the decisions regarding the replacement of members of the Central Committee VKP(b) and the election of new alternates for the Central Committee VKP(b), which do not require the ratification of the Central Committee VKP(b).

Decisions of the All-Union Conference, ratified by the Central Committee VKP(b), are binding on all Party organizations.

40. In order to strengthen Bolshevik leadership and political work, the Central Committee has the right to create political departments and to assign Party organizers of the Central Committee to lagging sectors of socialist construction which have acquired special importance for the national economy and the country as a whole; and, in proportion as the political departments fulfill their urgent tasks, to convert them into ordinary Party bodies, constructed on the production-territorial principle.

The political departments work on the basis of special instructions, confirmed by the Central Committee VKP(b).

41. The Central Committee keeps the Party organizations regularly informed of its work.

42. The Central Auditing Commission:

(a) Reviews the proper and expeditious handling of affairs by the central bodies of the Party and the proper working of the apparatus of the Secretariat of the Central Committee VKP(b) ;

(b) Audits the accounts of the treasury and the enterprises of the Central Committee VKP(b).

V. Oblast, Krai and Republic Organizations of the Party

43. The highest body of the oblast, krai and republic Party organizations is the Oblast or Krai Party Conference or the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, and in the interval between them—the Oblast or Krai Committee, or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic. They are guided in their activities by the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) and its leading bodies.

44. The regular Oblast and Krai Conference or the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic is called once every year and a half by the respective Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, while a special conference or congress is called by decision of the Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, or at the demand of one-third of the total membership of the organizations in the oblast or krai or republic Party organization.

The apportionment of representatives at the Oblast and Krai Conference or the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic is determined by the respective Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.

The Oblast or Krai Conference or the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic hears and adopts the reports of the Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, of the Auditing Commission and other oblast, krai or republic organizations, discusses questions of Party, soviet, economic and trade-union work in the oblast, krai or republic, and elects an Oblast Committee, Krai Committee or Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, an Auditing Commission, and the delegates to the All-Union Congress of the Party.

45. The Oblast Committee, the Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic appoints, for current work, corresponding executive bodies to consist of not more than eleven persons and 4 or 5 secretaries, including a First Secretary, a Second Secretary, and a Secretary for Cadres and a Secretary for Propaganda, to be confirmed by the Central Committee VKP(b). The secretaries must have Party standing of not less than five years.

46. The Oblast and Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic organizes various institu-

tions of the Party within the oblast, krai or republic, guides their activities, appoints the editorial staff of the oblast, krai or republic Party organ which works under its control, leads the Party groups in the non-Party organizations, organizes and conducts its own enterprises of general importance for the oblast, krai or republic, distributes within the confines of its organizations the forces and resources of the Party and manages the oblast, krai or republic Party funds.

47. The plenum of the Oblast or Krai Committee or of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic is convened at least once every three months.

48. Party organizations of Autonomous Republics, and also of National or other oblasts, which form part of the krai or Union Republic, work under the leadership of the respective Krai Committees or the Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, and are guided in their internal life by the regulations set forth in Section V of the rules of the Party concerning the oblast, krai and republic organizations.

VI. *The Okrug Organizations of the Party*

49. In the oblasts, krais and republics which have okrugs, there are established okrug Party organizations.

The highest body of the okrug Party organization is the Okrug Party Conference, convened by the Okrug Committee not less than once every year and a half, and special meetings are called by the decision of the Okrug Committee or on the demand of one-third of the total membership of the organizations in the okrug organization.

The Okrug Conference hears and adopts reports of the Okrug Committee, the Auditing Commission and other okrug Party organizations, elects the Okrug Committee of the Party, the Auditing Commission, and delegates to the Oblast or Krai Conferences or to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.

50. The Okrug Committee elects a bureau of not more than 9 persons and four secretaries of the Okrug Committee, including a First Secretary, a Second Secretary, a Secretary for Cadres and a Secretary for Propaganda. The secretaries must have a Party standing of three years. The secretaries of the Okrug Committee are confirmed by the Oblast Committee, the Krai Committee or Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.

51. The Okrug Committee organizes various institutions of the Party within the okrug, and guides their activities, appoints the editorial staff of the okrug Party organ which works under its guidance and control, leads the Party groups in the non-Party organizations, organizes its own enterprises of importance to the okrug, distributes within the confines of the okrug the forces and resources of the Party, and manages the okrug Party funds.

VII. *City and District (Rural and City) Organizations of the Party*

52. The City or District Party Conference is convened by the City or District Committee at least once a year; a special conference is con-

vened by decision of the City or District Committee or at the demand of one-third of the total membership of the Party organizations in the city or district.

The City or District Conference hears and adopts the reports of the City or District Committee, of the Auditing Commission and of the other city or district institutions, elects the City or District Committee, the Auditing Commission and the delegates to the Oblast or Krai Conference or to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.

53. The City or District Committee elects a bureau consisting of 7 to 9 persons, and three secretaries of the City Committee or District Committee of the Party. Secretaries of the City or District Committee must have a Party standing of not less than three years. The secretaries of the City and District Committee are confirmed by the Oblast Committee, Krai Committee, or Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic.

54. The City or District Committee organizes and confirms the primary Party organizations in enterprises, State farms, machine-tractor stations, collective farms and offices, keeps a register of all Communists, organizes various Party institutions within the confines of the city or district and guides their activities, appoints the editorial staff of the city or district Party organ which works under its guidance and control, leads the Party groups in the non-Party organizations, organizes its own enterprises of general importance for the city or district, distributes within the confines of the city or district the forces and resources of the Party and manages the city or district Party funds. The City or District Committee submits to the Oblast or Krai Committee or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic a report on its activities at such times and in such form as the Central Committee VKP(b) may specify.

55. The plenum of the City or District Committee is convened not less than once every month and a half.

56. In large cities, district organizations subordinate to the City Committee may be set up with the permission of the Central Committee VKP(b).

VIII. *Primary Party Organizations*

57. The primary Party organizations form the basis of the Party.

Primary Party organizations are set up at mills, factories, State farms, machine-tractor stations, and other economic enterprises, at collective farms, in units of the Red Army and Navy, in villages, offices, educational institutions, etc., where there are not less than three Party members.

At factories, collective farms, offices, etc., where there are less than three Party members, candidate or Party-Komsomol groups are established, headed by a Party organizer appointed by the District or City Committee or the political department.

The primary Party organizations are confirmed by the District or City Committee or by the corresponding political department.

58. In enterprises and offices, collective farms, etc., where there

are more than 100 Party members or candidates, shop, sector, or department, etc. Party organizations may be formed within the general primary organization which comprises the whole enterprise, office, etc., as may be required in any particular case subject to the approval of the District or City Committee or of the corresponding political department.

Within sector, shop, etc. organizations, as well as within primary Party organizations, where there are less than 100 members and candidates, Party groups may be formed according to the brigades and machine-units of the enterprise.

59. In large enterprises and offices where there are more than 500 Party members and candidates, there can be established, in each individual case with the permission of the Central Committee VKP(b), factory committees of the Party, and the rights of a primary Party organization are granted to the shop Party organizations of that enterprise.

60. The primary Party organization connects the masses of workers, peasants and intellectuals with the leading bodies of the Party. Its tasks are:

(a) Agitational and organizational work among the masses for the fulfillment of the Party slogans and decisions, along with securing the guidance of the factory press;

(b) The attraction of new members to the Party and their political training;

(c) Assistance to the District or City Committee or the political department in all its practical work;

(d) Mobilization of the masses at the factories, at the State farms, at the collective farms, etc. for the fulfillment of the production plan, the strengthening of labor discipline, the development of socialist competition and shock-brigade work;

(e) The struggle against laxity and mismanagement at the factories, on State farms, and on collective farms, and day-to-day attention to the improvement of the cultural and living conditions of the workers, office workers and collective farmers;

(f) Active participation in the economic and political life of the country.

61. To enhance the role of the primary Party organizations of economic enterprises, including the State farms, collective farms and machine-tractor stations, and their responsibility for the condition of work of the enterprise, these organizations have the right of control over the activity of the administration of the enterprise.

The Party organizations in the People's Commissariats, which, because of the special conditions of work in soviet offices, can not exercise functions of control, are obligated to give warning of the shortcomings of the work of the office, pointing out the deficiencies of the work of the People's Commissariat and of its individual workers, and to send these materials and considerations to the Central Committee VKP(b) and to the leaders of the People's Commissariat.

The secretaries of the primary Party organizations in the Commissariats are confirmed by the Central Committee VKP(b).

All Communists, who are workers in the central apparatus of a Commissariat, belong to one general Party organization for the Commissariat.

62. For the performance of current work, the primary Party organization elects a bureau of not more than 11 persons for a term of one year.

Bureaus of primary Party organizations are established in Party organizations numbering not less than 15 Party members.

In Party organizations, numbering less than 15 Party members, a bureau is not established, but a secretary of the primary Party organization is elected.

For the purpose of rapidly developing and training Party members in the spirit of collective leadership, the right to elect a bureau of 3 to 5 persons in a shop Party organization is given to shop Party organizations which number not less than 15 nor more than 100 Party members. And in shop Party organizations numbering more than 100, the bureau may consist of 5 to 7 persons.

In primary Party organizations, containing not more than 100 Party members, the Party work is conducted, as a rule, by workers who are not exempt from working at their regular jobs.

In primary Party organizations with up to 1,000 Party members, 2 or 3 paid workers carry on the work, and in those with a membership up to 3,000 or more, 4 or 5 comrades work, who are exempt from their regular jobs.

Secretaries of primary and of shop Party organizations must have Party standing of not less than one year.

IX. *The Party and the Komsomol*

63. The All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth [VLKSM] carries on its work under the leadership of the VKP(b). The Central Committee VLKSM, being the leading body of the Komsomol, is subordinate to the Central Committee VKP(b). The work of local organizations of the VLKSM is directed and controlled by the corresponding republic, krai, oblast, city, and district Party organization.

64. Members of the VLKSM who are members or candidates for the Party cease to be members of the Komsomol from the moment of their admission to the Party, if they do not occupy positions of leadership in the Komsomol organizations.

65. The VLKSM is the active assistant of the Party in all government and economic construction. The Komsomol organizations should in practice be the active leaders in carrying out Party directives in all fields of socialist construction, especially where there is no primary Party organization.

66. The Komsomol organizations have the right of broad initiative in discussing and reporting to the corresponding Party organization on all questions of the work of the enterprise, collective farm, State farm, office, connected with the elimination of deficiencies in the activity of the latter, and in giving them the necessary assistance for improving

the work, for organizing socialist competition and shock-brigade work, for conducting mass campaigns, etc.

X. Party Organizations in the Red Army, in the Navy and in Transport

67. The guidance of Party work in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army [RKKA] is exercised by the Political Administration of the RKKA, having the rights of a Military Department of the Central Committee VKP(b); and in the Workers' and Peasants' Navy, as well as in transport—by the Political Administration of the Navy and the Political Administration of Transport, having the rights of a Navy Department and a corresponding Transport Department of the Central Committee VKP(b).

The Political Administration of the RKKA, the Political Administration of the Navy and the Political Administration of Transport exercise their guidance through political departments appointed by them, Military Commissars, Party organizers, and Party commissions, elected at the corresponding army, navy and railroad conferences.

Party organizations in the Red Army, the Navy and in transport work on the basis of special instructions confirmed by the Central Committee VKP(b).

68. The chiefs of the political administrations of okrugs, of the fleets, of the army, and the chiefs of the political departments of the railroads, must have five-years' Party standing and chiefs of the political departments of divisions and brigades must have three-years' Party standing.

69. The political organizations must maintain close contact with the local Party committees by means of constant participation by the leaders of the political organizations and the military commissars in the local Party committees, as well as by regular reading at the Party committees of reports of the chiefs of the political organizations and of the military commissars on the political work in the military units and of the political departments in transport.

XI. Party Groups in Non-Party Organizations

70. At all congresses, conferences and elective organs of soviet, trade-union, cooperative and other mass organizations in which there are not less than three Party members, Party groups are organized whose task it is to consolidate the influence of the Party in every respect, and to carry out its policy among non-Party people, to strengthen Party and governmental discipline, to struggle against bureaucracy and to verify the fulfillment of Party and soviet directives. The group elects a secretary for its current work.

71. Party groups are subordinate to the corresponding Party organizations (Central Committee VKP(b), Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republic, Krai Committee, Oblast Committee, Okrug Committee, City Committee, District Committee).

In all questions the groups must be guided strictly and undeviatingly by the decisions of the leading Party bodies.

XII. Measures of Punishment for Violation of Party Discipline

72. The maintenance of Party unity, the relentless struggle against the slightest attempt at duplicity, at a factional fight or split, the observance of Party and government discipline are the foremost duties of all Party members and of all Party organizations.

73. The decisions of Party and soviet centres must be executed rapidly and precisely. Failure to carry out any decision of superior organizations, or any other offense regarded as criminal in the public opinion of the Party entails: for organizations—censure and a general re-registration (dissolution of the organization); for individual Party members—censure in one form or another (admonition, reprimand, etc.), public censure, temporary removal from responsible Party and soviet work, expulsion from the Party, expulsion from the Party with report of the offense to the administrative and judicial authorities.

74. In cases of violation of Party and governmental discipline, of causing or permitting duplicity and factionalism, by members of the Central Committee VKP(b), the Central Committee VKP(b) has the right to expel them from the Central Committee VKP(b), and, as the extreme measure, to expel them from the Party.

As a condition for applying this extreme measure to members of the Central Committee VKP(b) and to alternates for membership in the Central Committee VKP(b), the Plenum of the Central Committee VKP(b) must be convened and all the alternates invited. If such a general meeting of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds vote, regards it as necessary to expel a member of the Central Committee VKP(b) from the Central Committee or from the Party, then such a step must be taken immediately.

XIII. Party Funds

75. The funds of the Party and of its organizations are made up of membership dues, of the revenue from Party enterprises and of other items of revenue.

76. The following are the established amounts of monthly membership dues payable by Party members and candidates.

Those who receive up to	100 rubles in wages pay	20 kopeks
Those who receive from 101-150	rubles in wages pay	60 kopeks
" " " " 151-200	" " " "	1.00 rubles
" " " " 201-250	" " " "	1.50 rubles
" " " " 251-300	" " " "	2.00 rubles
" " " " 301-500	" " " "	2% of wages
" " " " over 500	" " " "	3% of wages

The amount of membership dues to be paid by members of the Party and candidates who have no fixed salary is determined by the Central Committee VKP(b).

77. Upon admission as a candidate, an initiation fee is charged which amounts to two per cent of the wages received.

(Translated from *Pravda*, March 27, 1939)

NEWS CHRONOLOGY

Newspapers are named primarily for convenient reference, although the same items may appear in other newspapers. The date given is the date on which the event occurred, while the number in parentheses following the name of the newspaper indicates the date of the paper in which the report appeared.

*The texts of decrees, treaties, etc., referred to in the items marked with an asterisk are available in full at the office of the American Russian Institute.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Administration

DECEMBER

- 5—Vast preparations for a countrywide celebration of the second anniversary of the Soviet Constitution on December 6 are announced.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)
- 8—Nikolai I. Ezhov resigns his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs because of ill health and overwork. He will continue in the post of Commissar of Water Transport.—*New York Times* (9)
- 27—Orenburg is renamed Chkalovsk and the Orenburg Oblast is similarly renamed.—*Pravda* (27)

JANUARY

- 3—The Commissariat of Light Industry is divided into the Commissariats of the Textile Industry and of Light Industry.—*Pravda* (3)*
- 12—The Commissariat of Defense Industries is divided into the Commissariats of the Aviation Industry, of Shipbuilding, of Munitions, and of Armaments.—*Pravda* (12)*
- 20—The Commissariat of Food Industry is divided into the Commissariats of the Fish Industry, of the Meat and Dairy Industry, and of Food Industry.—*Pravda* (20)*
- 25—The Commissariat of Heavy Industry is divided into the Commissariat of Fuel Industry, of Power Stations and Electrical Industry, of Ferrous Metallurgy, of Non-ferrous Metallurgy, of Chemical Industry and of Building Materials.—*Pravda* (25)*
- 30—The theses of Molotov's report on the Third Five-Year Plan to be made to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party are published.—*Pravda* (30)*
(See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, February 28 and March 15, 1939)

FEBRUARY

- 5—Tambov Oblast is divided into the Tambov Oblast and the Pensa Oblast.—*Pravda* (5)
- 6—The Commissariat of Machine Building is divided into the Commissariat of Heavy Machine Building, of Middle Machine Building and of General Machine Building.—*Pravda* (6)*

Agriculture

DECEMBER

- 5—An order is issued on the distribution of collective farm income, increasing the proportion which may be used for capital improvements.—*Pravda* (5)*
(See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, Feb. 15, 1939)

JANUARY

- 6—A regulation is issued aiming to increase the Fall planting of grain crops in the eastern agricultural regions.—*Pravda* (6)
- 14—Regulations are issued governing the payment of Machine-Tractor Stations for their services to the collective farms.—*Pravda* (14)*

FEBRUARY

- 4—New regulations are issued governing accounting methods of collective farms.—*Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* (4) and (5)
- 10—The names of 1200 collective farmers in the Ukraine who are to receive medals for outstanding achievements are published.—*New York Herald Tribune* (11)
- 19—The opening of the All-Union Agricultural Exposition in Moscow is officially set for August 1, 1939.—*Daily Worker* (20)

JANUARY

Art

- 5—S. S. Dukelsky, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Cinema, discusses the new system of pay for scenarists, composers, directors and other creative workers in the industry.—*Literaturnaya Gazeta* (5)* (Cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, January 30, 1939)
- 10—An All-Union contest of singers comes to an end.—*Izvestia* (10)

FEBRUARY

- 1—Many of the leading Soviet writers, including Sholokhov, Kataev, Virta and others are decorated.—*Pravda* (1)
- 2—Leading Soviet cinema workers, including Eisenstein, are decorated for their services.—*Sovetskoe Iskusstvo* (2)
- 12—The results of the All-Union Scenario Contest are announced.—*Pravda* (12)

DECEMBER

Aviation

- 15—Valeri Chkalov, one of the three Soviet aviators first to fly over the North Pole to this country, is killed in a crash while testing a new plane.—*New York Times* (16)
- 18—Chkalov's ashes are sealed in the Kremlin wall after a great funeral in the Red Square in which Stalin acted as one of the pallbearers.—*New York Times* (19)
- 30—Soviet civil aviation fulfilled its plan for 1938, having transported 234,000 passengers and 48,000 tons of mail and freight by plane.—*Daily Worker* (31)

Communist Party

JANUARY

- 27—Announcement is made that the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will open March 10. The agenda will include discussion of the Third Five-Year Plan and amendment of the Program and Rules of the Communist Party.—*Pravda* (27)* (Cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, February 28, 1939)

FEBRUARY

- 1—The theses of Zhdanov's report to be made to the XVIII Congress of the Communist Party on changes in the Rules of the Party are published.—*Pravda* (1)* (See *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, February 28, 1939)

Defense

DECEMBER

- 9—An order is issued governing political education in the Red Army.—*Pravda* (9)*

JANUARY

- 4—An order is issued introducing a new oath for all members of the armed forces and for all employees of the armed forces.—*Pravda* (4)*

FEBRUARY

- 23—*Izvestia* reports the launching of a new warship but gives no details of the vessel.—*New York Times* (24)

DECEMBER

Labor

- 21—An order is issued introducing "Work Books" for all Soviet workers.—*Pravda* (21)
- 28—Announcement is made that workers who set high standards of production in the coal industry, in agriculture and elsewhere will be rewarded with medals.—*New York Times* (28)
- 29—New labor regulations are introduced to improve labor discipline and to reduce labor turn-over.—*Pravda* (29)* (Cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, January 30, 1939)

JANUARY

- 8—An order is issued raising individual production standards or "norms" in the machine building industries and lowering piece work rates.—*New York Herald Tribune* (9)
- 26—Regulations are issued governing the rehiring of workers fired for tardiness.—*Pravda* (26)*

FEBRUARY

- 20—1,400 Soviet coal miners receive government orders for outstanding achievements.—*Daily Worker* (21)

DECEMBER

Science and Public Health

- 2—Moscow's strange twins, born with two heads and one body below the chest, die of pneumonia. Considerable scientific work was done on their development and behavior during their life of one year and 22 days.—*New York Herald Tribune* (3)
- 7—The skeleton of a rhinoceros, dating back to the glacial period, which was found in the Volga German Republic is being restored by the Paleontology Institute of the Academy of Sciences.—*New York Herald Tribune* (7)
- 11—It is reported that as a result of findings of the crew of the icebreaker Sedov, now drifting toward the North Pole, Soviet scientists have concluded that the Arctic region as well as the rest of the world is growing warmer.—*New York Times* (12)
- 12—It is announced that a "time capsule" larger than that buried in the 1939 New York World's Fair is to be placed in the foundation of the Palace of Soviets. This capsule is to contain a record of the development of socialism and communism.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)
- 25—The All-Union Congress of Surgeons opens in Moscow.—*Pravda* (25)
- 26—It is announced that Professor Peter Kapitsa has perfected a new method for liquefying gas.—*New York Times* (27)

JANUARY

- 15—It is announced that the Pavlov Institute has developed a medicine from the extract of a South African tree which is said to increase the resistance of airplane pilots against fatigue at high altitudes.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)
- 26—A Conference of Microbiologists meets.—*Pravda* (26)
- 29—The election of new members of the Academy of Sciences is completed, with 56 new members and 102 corresponding members being added.—*Pravda* (29) (Cf. *Bulletin on the Soviet Union*, December 30, 1938)

FEBRUARY

- 18—The Soviet icebreaker, *Sedov*, drifting in the Arctic over a year, reaches a point farther north than that attained by the *Fram* in which Nansen attempted to reach the North Pole in 1895.—*New York Times* (19)
- 24—A gas developed from a serum extracted from infected horses is administered to all the employees of a Moscow department store as treatment against grippe. The results are said to have been successful.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 25—Lina Stern, only woman member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, is reported to have developed a solution to be used in the treatment of cases of severe shock.—*New York Herald Tribune* (27)

DECEMBER

Miscellaneous

- 27—The Soviet newspaper, *Machine Building*, prints an article by engineers urging the production of low-priced popular cars.—*New York Herald Tribune* (28)

JANUARY

- 6—Soviet citizens who embrace the Orthodox faith go to church to observe Christmas Eve services, held on this date under the old Julian calendar.—*New York Herald Tribune*. (7)
- 16—The new icebreaker *Lazar Kaganovich* is ready for service and leaves for the Far East where it is to be stationed.—*Izvestia* (16)
- 17—The main work on the census begins today.—*Pravda* (17)*
- 21—The fifteenth anniversary of the death of Lenin is widely observed with memorial meetings, speeches and newspaper articles.—*New York Times* (22)

FEBRUARY

- 5—Final work on checking the census is completed.—*Izvestia* (5)
- 7—It is reported that the Soviet newspaper, *Medical Worker*, criticized birth control appliances for their poor quality and called for a campaign of wider birth control education and improved appliances.—*New York Herald Tribune* (8)
- 27—The operator of an Arctic radio station is sentenced to twenty years in prison for sabotaging Arctic communications during the unsuccessful trans-Polar flight on which Levanovsky and his companions were lost.—*New York Herald Tribune* (28)
- 27—Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, widow of Lenin, dies at the age of 70.—*New York Times* (28)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

European Affairs

DECEMBER

- 8—Soviet newspaper comment on the French-German agreement designates it as a serious menace to France's national interests.—*New York Herald Tribune* (9)
- 15—The German press calls for a campaign for the establishment of a new Ukrainian state to include what is now the Ukrainian S.S.R.—*New York Herald Tribune* (16)
- 21—As a result of conversations between Poland and the USSR, preliminary agreement is reached for negotiations to increase trade between the two countries.—*Pravda* (21)
- 23—The Soviet-German Trade and Exchange Agreement is extended for 1939.—*Pravda* (23)
- 26—The Soviet Union and Italy agree to close their respective consulates in Milan and Odessa, as a result of an anti-Soviet attack on the Milan consulate earlier in the month.—*Pravda* (26)

- 27—There is an exchange of notes between the Soviet Union and Finland on the definition of the border between them and the establishment of a border commission.—*Pravda* (27)
- 28—The *Journal de Moscou* terms the German talk concerning the Soviet Ukraine merely a smoke screen covering fascist and Nazi ambitions elsewhere.—*New York Times* (28)

JANUARY

- 3—The Soviet-French Trade Agreement is extended for 1939 without change. *Industria* (3)
- 11—The Soviet-Estonian Trade Agreement is extended for 1939.—*Pravda* (11)

FEBRUARY

- 3—The Soviet Union and Hungary agree to close their respective consulates, as a result of Hungary's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.—*Izvestia* (3)
- 7—Italy and the Soviet Union sign agreements settling the economic disputes outstanding between them and regulating trade relations.—*Pravda* (8)
- 11—The Soviet-Latvian Trade Agreement for 1939 is signed.—*Pravda* (14)
- 14—The Soviet-Lithuanian Trade Agreement for 1939 is signed.—*Pravda* (15)
- 19—The Soviet Union and Poland sign a trade agreement designed to increase their trade considerably.—*New York Herald Tribune* (20)
- 21—People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov receives the new French Ambassador, Paul Naggiar.—*New York Herald Tribune* (22)
- 27—TASS, official Soviet news agency, announces that the Soviet Government has appropriated 5,000,000 francs for the relief of Spanish refugees.—*New York Times* (28)

Far Eastern Affairs

DECEMBER

Throughout the month negotiations were carried on between Japan and the Soviet Union regarding the fisheries in Far Eastern waters. (Cf. *Pravda*, December 8, 10, 15, 25, January 28)

- 3—Japan is accused in a Soviet news broadcast of detaining eleven shipwrecked Soviet fishermen. The men are reported being held as hostages pending the return of Japanese "border violators" held by the Soviets.—*New York Times* (4)

JANUARY

- 13—*Domei*, Japanese news agency, reports that Soviet arms and munitions have been reaching Chinese armies in increasing amounts, being shipped by the overland highway from Siberia into China's northwest.—*New York Herald Tribune* (14)

FEBRUARY

- 2—An incident is reported on the Soviet-Manchurian border.—*Pravda* (2)
- 9—An incident is reported on the Soviet-Manchurian border.—*Pravda* (9)
- In press comments on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, a contrast is drawn to the present Soviet-Japanese situation, and Japan is warned that she no longer faces an "utterly rotten Tsarist state" but a first-class military power.—*New York Times* (10)

United States, Affairs Concerning

DECEMBER

- 5—The Court of the Constitution in the Soviet Pavilion of the New York World's Fair is dedicated.—*New York Herald Tribune* (6)
- 13—Two men are arrested in Los Angeles accused of sending documents of the United States Naval Intelligence Bureau to Soviet Russia.—*New York Times* (14)

JANUARY

- 17—The *Journal de Moscou* calls President Roosevelt, "the only statesman in the bourgeois world aware of fascism's threat and courageous enough to express himself."—*New York Herald Tribune* (18)
- 24—It is announced by the Harvard College Observatory that a Soviet scientist in Central Asia and an American amateur astronomer simultaneously discovered a new comet, which is to be named for the two discoverers.—*New York Herald Tribune* (25)
- 29—Mikhail I. Kalinin, President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, broadcasts his country's salute to the New York World's Fair, while Soviet officials in this country raise the Soviet flag over their Pavilion.—*New York Times* (29)

FEBRUARY

- 17—A Soviet steamer arrives in New York with material for exhibits at the New York World's Fair.—*Daily Worker* (17)

JANUARY

Miscellaneous

- 3—A report from Santiago, Chile, states that there will be early recognition of the Soviet Government and the establishment of diplomatic and consular services, with the further view to establishing new markets for Chilean products and to large scale importation of Soviet goods.—*New York Times* (4)

FEBRUARY

- 6—The Treaty of Friendship and Trade between the USSR and Yemen is extended until April 24, 1949.—*Izvestia* (6)
- 8—It is reported from Moscow that at a luncheon given a week earlier by the Turkish Ambassador, Foreign Commissar Litvinov made the suggestion that a Black Sea Pact be discussed by the pertinent countries.—*New York Times* (9)

RECENT APPOINTMENTS

- Beria, L. P.—Commissar of Internal Affairs (Dec. 8, 1938)
- Denisov, M. F.—Commissar of the Chemical Industry (Jan. 25)
- Kaganovich, L. M.—Commissar of the Fuel Industry (Jan. 25)
- Kaganovich, M. M.—Commissar of the Aviation Industry (Jan. 12)
- Kosygin, A. N.—Commissar of the Textile Industry (Jan. 3)
- Likhachev, I. A.—Commissar of Medium Machine-Building (Feb. 6)
- Liubimov, A. V.—Commissar of Trade (Jan. 21)
- Lobanov, P. P.—Commissar of State Grain and Livestock Farms (Dec. 12)
- Lukin, S. G.—Commissar of Light Industry (Jan. 3)
- Malyshev, V. M.—Commissar of Heavy Machine-Building (Feb. 6)
- Merkulov, F. A.—Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy (Jan. 25)
- Parshin, P. I.—Commissar of General Machine-Building (Feb. 6)
- Pervukhin, M. G.—Commissar of Electric Stations and the Electrical Industry (Jan. 25)
- Samokhvalov, A. I.—Commissar of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (Jan. 25)
- Sergeev, I. P.—Commissar of Munitions (Jan. 12)
- Smirnov, P. V.—Commissar of Meat and Dairy Industry (Jan. 20)
- Sosnin, L. A.—Commissar of Building Materials Industry (Jan. 25)
- Tevosian, I. T.—Commissar of Shipbuilding (Jan. 12)
- Vannikov, B. L.—Commissar of Armaments (Jan. 12)
- Zhemchuzhina, P. S.—Commissar of Fish Industry (Jan. 20)
- Zotov, V. P.—Commissar of Food Industry (Jan. 20)

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
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